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VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH
STATE TOLERANCE OF STREET-LEVEL
BRIBERY: CASE STUDY, SLOVAKIA
Jarmila Lajcakova*t
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) l , Central and Eastern European countries are ranked among the
most corrupt worldwide. 2 The phenomenon of corruption is perceived as a
significant inhibitor of economic, social and political transition in Central
and Eastern Europe.3 Evidently, corruption slows down economic growth;
4
* Consultant, Transparency International Slovakia; Consultant, the Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, Human Rights and Minorities,
Slovak Republic. LL.B., Comenius University, Slovakia, 2000; LL.M. University
of Toronto, 2002; M.A. (Sociology) candidate, Comenius University Slovakia. I am
indebted to Kevin Davis, Madelaine Chiam, John LaCalamita and especially to this
article. The article will be presented at the interdisciplinary symposium "RE-CON-
STRUCTING CORRUPTION", University of East Anglia, United Kingdom, April
30 - May 2, 2003.
t Editors' note: Translation of documents originating in Slovak to English pro-
vided by author.
1 The CPI 2002 ranks 201 countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. The CPI is a composite
index, drawing on 15 different polls from 9 independent institutions. The CPI is
scaled from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Frame-
work Document 2002: Background Paper to the 2002 Corruption Perception In-
dex, Transparency International, at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/dnld/
cpi2002.methodology.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
2 Within the Central and Eastern European region, the highest level of corruption
is in Ukraine (85th position with the index size 2.4), Romania (77th position, 2.6),
Russia (71st position, 2.7), Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovak republic, (52nd po-
sition, 3.7), Croatia (51st position, 3.8), Bulgaria and Poland (45th position, 4.0).
(TI - all rankings as posted on Aug. 28, 2002), at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/
2002/cpi2002.en.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
3 See generally, Luke Allnutt et al., Central Southeast Europe and Baltic States -
The Global Corruption Report 2001, TI report, 124-125 (2001), at http://
gcr.netscript.kunde.sserv.de/download/gcr200 1/rrceseb.pdf (last visited: Aug. 29,
2002); Sanjay Pradham et. al., Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the
Policy Debate, The World Bank report (2000), http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/eca/
eca.nsf/General/D74DB51B2D46615D8525695B00678C93?OpenDocument (last
visited Aug. 29, 2002).
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further deepens the level of poverty in already poor countries; 5 and under-
mines political development and democracy. 6 Corruption tends to particu-
larly flourish in countries with an ineffective legal system and weak
guarantees of basic economic rights. 7
Nevertheless, the authors condemning corruption give little atten-
tion to the analysis of corruption from a human rights perspective. 8 Human
4 See, e.g., Paolo Mauro, Corruption and growth, 110 (3) Q. J. ECON. 681,
(1995); Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth,
IMF working paper 97/139 (1997), at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
wp97139.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
5 See, e.g., Sanjeev Gupta et al., Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and
Poverty?, IMF working paper 98/76 (1998), at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
wp/wp9876.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
6 See, e.g., Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption, 35
FrI. & DEV. 3- 4 (1998), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/
klitgaar.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2002); Philip M. Nichols, Extraterritorial Re-
strictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International Policy Goal Under the
Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? Increasing Global Security by
Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 451, 467-468 (1999).
7 Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-national Study, 76 J. PUB.
ECON. 399, 439-441 (2000).
8 Among a limited number of authors who contributed to the human rights per-
spective on corruption are Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy and
Human Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 495 (1999);
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and
Collective Human Rights: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under Interna-
tional Law, 34 INT'L L. 149 (2000); Nihal Jayawickrama, Corruption - A Violation
of Human Rights?, TI working paper (1998), at http://www.transparency.org/work-
ing-papers/jayawickrama/jayawickrama.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2002); Lau-
rence Cockroft, Corruption and Human Rights: A Crucial Link, TI working paper
(1998), at http://www.transparency.org/working-papers/cockcroft/cockcroft.html
(last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
Official recognition of the relationship between corruption and human
rights can be found, for instance, in the Preamble of the Council of Europe Crimi-
nal Law Convention. "Emphasizing that corruption threatens the rule of law, de-
mocracy and human rights, undermines good governance, fairness and social
justice, distorts competition, hinders economic development and endangers the sta-
bility of democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society." Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173, (entered into force
July 1, 2002), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Htnil/
173.htm [hereinafter COE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption]. The same
preambular wording incorporates Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Cor-
ruption of 1999, ETS No. 174, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
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rights law is argued to be a yardstick for a state's legitimacy and its interna-
tional recognition.9 The aim of this paper is to challenge the phenomenon
of corruption from this, rather unconventional, perspective.
This paper is a case study of corruption in a single Central Euro-
pean country, Slovakia. Slovakia's "degree of corruption" within Central
Europe is approximately median on the afore-mentioned CPI. Since the
forms and patterns of corruption in Slovakia resemble to a large extent
those of other Central and Eastern European countries, it provides a suitable
analytical example. Moreover, Slovakia shares a comparable modem his-
torical, political, social, economic, and, importantly, legal background with
other Central and Eastern European countries. Hence, the concepts dis-
cussed in this paper are not limited in application to Slovakia.
What exactly is "corruption"? There is an ongoing, sometimes
opaque debate over the definition of corruption.'0 The term occurs in many
different settings, and describes a whole range of acts in the public as well
as private sector-everything from bribery to using political power to ad-
vance a certain cause. This paper focuses on a specific sub-category of
corruption: small-scale or petty bribery. Petty bribery is a part of everyday
life for people in Slovakia. It involves interaction between citizens and
lower officials. To underscore the everyday aspect of bribery as well as the
interaction on the "street", this paper will use the term "street-level brib-
ery"" to describe this sub-category of corruption. From a human rights
HtmIl74.htm (The Convention is open for signature and has yet not entered into
force as of Aug. 29, 2002).
9 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS,
(Oxford University Press 1990).
l0 For instance, Agnieszka Klich argues that the legal definition enshrined in the
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act does not capture the essence of transition and
that definitions used by political scientists do not provide reliable criteria applicable
for economies in transition. Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition:
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'l L. 121, 126-130. Vito Tanzi
argues that the debate on the definition tends to absorb too much time and although
corruption is difficult to describe, it is not difficult to recognize. Vito Tanzi, Cor-
ruption Around the World - Causes, Consequences, Scopes, and Cure, IMF work-
ing paper 98/63, 8 (1998), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/wp9863.pdf
(last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
11 1 borrow the term "street-level" from sociologist Michael Lipsky, who used the
term street-level bureaucracy to capture the collective behaviour of public service
organization, and to advance a theory of the work of street-level bureaucracies as
individuals experience it. Street-level bureaucracies are "the schools, police and
welfare departments, lower courts, legal offices, and other agencies whose workers
interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allo-
2003
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perspective, the relationship between the citizens and the state is of major
concern. People are forced, directly or indirectly, to pay petty bribes to
secure existing legal rights, many of which may also be categorized as
human rights. This is a crucial and often underestimated aspect of street-
level bribery.
Street-level bribery, for the purposes of this paper, means a bilateral
transaction, under which a state employee renders a legal right in exchange
for a petty bribe or promise of such a bribe. Generally, the size of a petty
bribe, whether in form of a cash payment or a gift in kind, is not greater in
value than the provisions of the Slovak Criminal Code define as
insignificant. 12
In Slovakia, street-level bribery is the most frequent form of cor-
ruption. The state practically tolerates small-scale bribery. The state fails
to prevent, and prohibit small-scale bribery and fails to enforce existing
criminal provisions under domestic law relating to corruption. Moreover,
petty bribery is often beyond the interest and concern of the international
community.
This paper focuses on street-level bribery in two public sectors-
the judiciary and healthcare. The state's failure to eliminate street-level
bribery has created a situation where the enjoyment of human rights, in-
cluding the right to a fair trial and the right to health, is effectively condi-
tioned upon a payment of a bribe. Ultimately the state, by act of omission,
infringes on people's right to enjoy both a civil and a political right-the
right to a fair trial and the socio-economic right to health. Moreover, the
conditional access to these two rights has even deeper consequences. The
state's tolerance of street-level bribery indirectly discriminates against the
poor in their access to justice and healthcare and thus violates a fundamen-
tal human right not to be discriminated against.
In Section 2, the paper discusses the scope of street-level bribery in
Slovakia with a particular focus on the judiciary and healthcare. Section 3
shows that the State is tolerant towards street-level bribery, as externalized
in the state's response to the issues of prohibition, enforcement and preven-
tion of this phenomenon. Section 3 also argues that petty bribery is beyond
the scope of international efforts targeting corruption. Section 4 discusses
the extent of the rights for which Slovaks are required to pay bribes. Fun-
cation of public sanctions." MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY xi
(1980). I was inspired by Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina, who also used the
Lipsky's term street-level bureaucracy. WILLIAM L. MILLER, ASE B. GRODELAND
& TATYANA Y. KOSHECHKINA, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION: COPING WITH Gov-
ERNMENT IN POST COMMUNIST EUROPE 21 (2001).
12 See discussion infra pp.18-21.
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damentally, these include the right to a fair trial, (specifically the inaliena-
ble right to be adjudicated without unreasonable delay), and the right to
health. The main aim of Section 4 is to analyze how street-level bribery
infringes the right to a fair trial, the right to health and ultimately, in a more
hidden form, the right not to be discriminated against. The paper concludes
by suggesting policy recommendations to eliminate street-level bribery.
II. SCOPE OF STREET-LEVEL BRIBERY
Corruption in Slovakia and other post-communist countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe is certainly not a new phenomenon. Communist
rule, traditionally bureaucratic, offered a fertile environment for spreading
corrupt practices across all public sectors.' 3 It might be relatively simple to
argue that the corruption in post-communist countries is an extension of the
corruption that existed under communism. Miller, Grodeland and
Koshechina point out that there is a difference between corruption resulting
from historical and cultural tradition and corruption resulting from the
chaos of transition.' 4 The existence of the first type of corruption suggests
that any reform aiming to change the status quo is almost impossible. How-
ever, the growth of corruption 15, following the region's political events of
1989, indicates that corruption is not culturally and historically predeter-
mined. 16 Reform is possible, but which form of corruption should a compre-
hensive reform target, and how bad is corruption in Slovakia?
What direct impact does corruption have on ordinary citizens in
their everyday lives? Interactions with lower officials shape the everyday
life of ordinary citizens in important ways. "The decisions of street level
bureaucrats, the routine they establish, and the device they invent to cope
13 Given the nature of most communist economies, almost all sectors, including
those traditionally "private," become "public".
14 MILLER, GRODELAND & KOSHECHKINA, supra note 11.
15 The levels of bribery were much worse in 1998 than ten years prior. The num-
ber of respondents in 1999, who answered to a question: "What is your opinion of
bribery in people's everyday life in today's society?" with an answer: "Bribery is
altogether a definite part of contemporary life-whoever wants to make living must
give," in comparison with 1989, almost tripled. Corruption in Slovakia: Results of
Diagnostic Surveys 2000, The World Bank and USAID, 3 (2000), at http://
www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/pdf/guide-pdfs/slovrep44.pdf (last visited
Aug. 29, 2002) [hereinafter The World Bank Survey 2000]. Similarly, according to
results of another Survey led by Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina 45 percent of
respondents think that clients are more willing to give gifts now because officials
expect more. MILLER, GRODELAND & KOSHECHKINA, supra note 11., at 143.
16 MILLER, GRODELAND & KOSHECHKINA, supra note 11, at 21.
116 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 9
with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public poli-
cies they carry out."1 7 Crowded offices and daily encounters with lower
officials provide a more accurate view on public policy than legislatures
and acts of high-ranking officials. 18 Lawyers should be aware of how laws
are made, but also how they are obeyed and executed at the level closest to
the citizens.
The results of the World Bank Survey, undertaken in Slovakia, in
2000,19 suggest that households, rather than enterprises, 20 more frequently
interact with and bribe 2' those public institutions identified as the most cor-
rupt. 22 According to data on the perception of corruption,23 these are the
healthcare sector and the judiciary. 24
The quality of the justice system is a key precondition for democ-
racy, rule of law and the protection of human rights. Healthcare is the sec-
tor with which people interact most frequently.2 5 Health is the most
significant value to the Slovak population.26 While focusing on these two
17 MICHAEL LIPSKY, supra note 11, at XII.
18 Id. at XII.
19 The World Bank Survey 2000 undertook surveys of perception and experience
with corruption among three groups: households, enterprise managers, and public
officials. The World Bank Survey 2000, supra note 15, at VI.
20 The World Bank Survey 2000 separates households and enterprises in gathering
data from bribe payers. Given the focus of this paper, data presented reflect those
of households. Id.
21 Respondents in the household survey were asked about their experience within
the past two years. Id. at 17.
22 In answering the question: "In your opinion, does corruption exist in the follow-
ing fields in Slovakia?" more than 60 percent of the respondents answered it is
"very widespread" in the healthcare system; more than 55 percent of the respon-
dents answered it is "very widespread" in the justice system; Another sector with a
high degree of corruption are the police (50 percent of respondents believe that
corruption is very widespread in the police) and the education system (35 percent).
Id. at 7-8.
23 Although the measurement of perception is often dismissed as not reflecting
reality and being biased by the media, the Survey of The World Bank demonstrates
that those public sectors "perceived" as highly corrupt are the same ones respon-
dents indicate as being those with which they have actually had the greatest actual
experience with corruption. Id. at 7.
24 Id. at 8.
25 See infra note 44.
26 Health dominates over other common values for all demographic and social
groups. Ninety-two percent of respondents indicated health among the most impor-
tant values. Faces of Corruption in Slovakia I, Part 11.1 Corruption in the Health
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public sectors, the paper inquires how street-level bribery impacts civil, po-
litical as well as socio-economic rights of individuals.
A. The Justice System
The Slovak justice system has not undergone any comprehensive
and consistent reform since the social change of 1989. An effective mecha-
nism to prevent corruption is still missing. 27 Hence, the overall risk faced
by corrupt judges is relatively small, relative to the profit attainable by the
misuse of their public power. 28 Citizens perceive that the justice system
suffers from a lack of judicial independence, and that the overall decision-
making process is slow and inefficient.29 Since 1989, there has been an
enormous growth in the number of cases filed with the Slovak courts.30 The
state failed to satisfactorily meet the increase in demand with the capacity
of the courts. 31 Less than 17 percent of the respondents of the World Bank
Care, TI Slovakia study, 2 (1999) at 2, at http://www.transparency.sk/english/
studyjaces-of corruption_2_l.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Cor-
ruption in the Health Care].
27 See, discussion on the State's activities aiming to curb corruption in the judici-
ary at p.316-319, below.
28 Poor monitoring systems and low enumeration have traditionally been consid-
ered the main causes of corruption in the judiciary. See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD,
ADJUSTING TO REALITY: BEYOND STATE VERSUS MARKET IN EcoNoMIc DEVELOP-
MENT (ICS Press 1991).
29 Faces of Corruption in Slovakia L Part 11. 11 Corruption in the Justice System,
TI Slovakia study, 5 (1999), at http://www.transparency.sk/english/
study-faces-of corruption_2_1 1.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002). [hereinafter Cor-
ruption in the Justice system]. Slowness of courts, in particular in civil proceedings,
confirms the finding of The World Bank Survey 2000. According to the survey of
enterprises, more than 75 percent of respondents claimed that the main obstacles of
doing business in Slovakia are "slow courts" and "low execution of justice." The
World Bank Survey 2000, supra note 15, at 15.
30 For instance, a number of filed civil actions (it does not contain administrative
proceedings, matrimonial and affiliation proceedings, and cases in relation to the
Commercial Register of the Slovak Republic) brought to the Slovak Courts in 1986
were 65,000 whereas in 2001 it was 105, 000. Statistical data is available at the
official website of the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, http://
www.justice.gov.sk (in Slovak) (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
31 Households, participating in the World Bank Survey 2000, perceived that the
problem of court inefficiency and bribery has become worse over the past three
years. Twenty seven percent of respondents said the quality of work in the judici-
ary has worsened. In regards to bribery in the judiciary, 45 percent said that it had
worsened. The Survey of The World Bank 2000, supra note 15, at 35.
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Survey 2000 believed that court proceedings were fast and without unrea-
sonable delays.32 In Slovakia, there is a general perception that the time
from filing to completion of an action is too long, and 43 percent of respon-
dents avoid the courts entirely because of the necessity to pay bribes.33
The official statistics of the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Re-
public suggest that in civil proceedings,3 4 in more than 15 percent of the
cases, it takes more than two years to decide an outcome. On average, it
takes approximately 14 months. 35 These statistics register only completed
cases and do not include data on cases that are currently pending in the
Slovak courts. The courts are only able to process, on average, less than 40
percent of all filed petitions, including those from previous years. 36 In fact,
district courts cause the vast majority of delays.37 Moreover, according to
the statistics, "completion" of a case may include the mere transfer of the
case to another court's jurisdiction.38
The insufficient capacity of courts creates a fertile environment for
corruption. In a household survey the respondents admitted that in 25 per-
cent of the cases where they interacted with the judiciary39 they gave 'some-
thing special' to a court employee, a judge or an attorney. Almost 20
percent of the time, these respondents claimed that the payments were in-
voluntary.40 Slowness of decision-making was the principal cause of the
behaviour-55 percent identified that acceleration of the trial process was
32 Id. at 34- 35.
13 Id. at 35.
34 Since street-level bribery to speed-up proceedings is especially prevalent in
civil proceedings, further analysis focuses on trial on civil rights and obligations.
35 Official Statistics of the Slovak Ministry of Justice, section: The length of deci-
sion-making of the courts in selected civil matters in 2001, supra note 30.
36 Id. Official Statistics of the Slovak Ministry of Justice, section: Overview of a
civil-matter agenda in the district courts in 2001, [hereinafter Overview of a civil-
matter agenda in the district courts in 2001].
37 Report of the Ministry of Justice on "Court management model" presented on
the Slovak Government's session on July 7, 2002, http://www.justice.gov.sk/pk/
pk06l-02.htm (Slovk.) (last visited Aug. 29, 2002). (hereinafter Report of the Min-
istry of Justice of July 7, 2002).
38 Overview of a civil-matter agenda in the district courts, supra note 30.
39 Thirteen percent of all surveyed households were involved in court trials. The
World Bank Survey 2000, supra note 15, at 34.
40 Id. at 34.
STREET-LEVEL BRIBERY
the main reason for corruption. 41 Seventy-five percent believed that a bribe
was a necessary requirement to obtain a legal right from court officials. 42
The above-mentioned sociological data suggests that in a majority
of instances, people are directly or indirectly required to bribe to secure
their right to a fair trial and the right to be adjudicated without unreasonable
delay-a right protected as an international human right as well as a Consti-
tutional right in Slovakia. 43
B. The Healthcare System
Healthcare is the state sector that impacts the largest proportion of
the population44 and the sector with the most widespread corruption. The
vast majority of healthcare services in Slovakia are provided by state medi-
cal facilities. The state is also the sole responsible authority for the legal
framework regulating medical facilities, state and private health and social
insurance, as well as pharmacies. According to a study by Transparency
International Slovakia, the systemic lack of public money for healthcare,
and in particular the low remuneration of healthcare workers, has been one
of the major facilitators of corruption within the sector.45 Healthcare wages
have grown at a visibly slower pace than in other sectors. 46 In the Survey of
the World Bank on corruption in healthcare, the respondents were asked
about their three most recent experiences. 47 Among the most problematic
areas were emergency treatments and hospital stays.4 8 For these two types
of medical visits, there was no private alternative. 49 The survey found the
average waiting time for an emergency treatment did not significantly differ
from the waiting time for non-emergencies, such as a dental treatment.
41 Sixty-five percent identified the acceleration of the process as one of the top
three reasons. Significantly lower numbers (17 percent) of those bribed officials in
order to influence the court's decision. Twelve percent reported their conduct as an
expression of gratitude. Id. at 35.
42 Data refers to Slovakia. MILLER, GRODELAND & KOSHECHKINA, supra note 11,
at 73.
43 See discussion in section IV.A, p.323-334.
44 Eighty percent of respondents of household surveys visited a medical facility in
the last two years. The World Bank Survey 2000, supra note 15, at 22.
45 Corruption in the Health Care, supra note 26, at 3.
46 Id. at 3.
47 The World Bank Survey 2000, supra note 15, at 22.
48 Id. at 23-24.
49 Id. at 22-25. People were generally more satisfied with treatment by a private
rather than a state agency. However, corruption is similarly spread in the private
sector as well.
2003
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Overall, the length of waiting time for access to healthcare facilities was
seen as unsatisfactory.
According to 89 percent of the respondents, a person is likely to
offer a bribe in order to obtain legal entitlements from hospital doctors,50
i.e., for 'proper care' to which they are already legally entitled. The major-
ity of respondents indicated that improvement of health care quality and
reducing waiting time were their reasons for bribery. Only a minority of
the respondents intended to express gratitude.5 1 In many cases, the form of
bribe was a gift of goods, rather than money. However, money was fre-
quently paid to medical specialists for performing surgery.52 Data suggest
that people paid bribes to secure access-a right already guaranteed in In-
ternational Human Rights law and the Slovak Constitution.53
C. Bribes vs. Gifts
Any discussion of bribery leads to the distinction, if any, with "gift
giving." The prevalent form of corruption in healthcare and the judiciary is
the offer of a bribe, the so-called 'pozornost. ,54 The Slovak expression
pozornost can be translated as "attention," and is understood to mean a gift,
money or a service. Rose-Ackerman distinguishes between bribes, gifts,
prices and tips on two grounds. First, whether they are given in return for a
quid pro quo. Second, whether they are given to agents or to principals. A
"bribe" would be an informal offering to a principal, where formally such
an offering is not required, in return for consideration-a benefit. A "gift"
would be an offering to a principal for no explicit consideration. According
to this scheme, a tip is paid to an agent for no explicit return. 55 However,
50 Data refers to Slovakia. MILLER, GRODELAND & KOSHECHKINA, supra note 11,
at 73.
51 The World Bank Survey 2000, supra note 15, at 26.
52 Id. at 23.
53 See discussion infra section IV.B.
54 The term "pozomost" has been used in the Survey of the World Bank 2000.
The World Bank Survey 2000, supra at 4.
55 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSE-
QUENCES, AND REFORM 92-93, (Cambridge University Press 1999). Within this
scheme, an appropriate term for "gifts" given to healthcare or court employees are
"tips" since they are "agents" - state employees. Nevertheless, given the available
sociological surveys operate with term "gift" rather then "tips" even if the donee
are state agents, the paper will use the term "gifts".
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even if gifts lack an explicit quid pro quo arrangement, a subtle linkage
might still exist.5 6 It would be nafve to claim that no favours are expected.
Another traditional method of differentiation between bribes and
gifts is the evaluation of the size and the timing of the offering. If a gift is
small, it may signal politeness and appreciation. Gifts are usually given
after the service is completed whereas bribes are usually given prior to a
service being performed.5 7
These distinctions, however, are easier to draw in theory than in
practice. For instance, the definition of a "small" or "large" gift can be
highly subjective; one person's definition of "small" may represent a signif-
icant proportion of another's monthly income. Moreover, people usually
interact with, for instance, hospital doctors on a repeated basis. Hence, a
gift given after surgery can be intended to secure proper treatment during
the following recovery period. Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina found
that in Slovakia, 30 percent of the respondents admitted that the reason for
giving a gift afterwards, was the fear they might need help in the future,
from the same official. They could not take the risk of disappointing or
offending them. 58 A significant number of the respondents-27 percent-
who perceived gift giving as a form of extortion (where officials ask for or
expect rewards), gave a gift after their problem had been solved. 59
Is gift giving to state employees in Slovakia indeed bribery? Rose-
Ackerman concludes that definitions are a cultural matter, and are therefore
constantly changing. The most appropriate attribute for distinguishing gifts
from bribes should be local perception. 60 According to the Survey of the
World Bank, people gave pozornost in healthcare, because it was assumed
to be necessary or was actually requested. 61 Even where respondents re-
ported that the bribe was paid or gift was given to express gratitude, it was
nevertheless viewed as corruption. 62 People involved in 'after the fact' gift
giving are aware of the causal relationship between a gift and the perform-
ance of a public authority. Moreover, gifts given after service performance
are viewed as improper, since the public official receives additional per-
56 Id. at 93. Rose-Ackerman uses an example of a university starting a new profes-
sional school, hoping to attract donations.
57 MILLER, GRODELAND & KOSHECHKINA, supra note 11, at 151.
58 Id. at 154-155.
59 Id. at 154.
60 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 55, at 110.
61 World Bank Survey 2000, supra note 15, at 25.
62 Id. at 25-26.
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sonal gain from the exercise of public power.63 Ultimately, the term 'brib-
ery' is more appropriate to the vast majority of encounters when people
give gifts to public officials, regardless of timing.
The prevalent form of corruption in healthcare and in the judiciary
is small-scale bribery, regardless of the timing and the size and form of the
offering. Importantly, in the vast majority of instances, bribes were paid in
exchange for legal rights, not illegal favours.
III. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTEREST
Previous sections suggested that street-level bribery in the judiciary
and healthcare share an important pattern: people are directly or indirectly
required to bribe to obtain something to which they are already legally enti-
tled. From a democratic and a human rights perspective, the requirement to
pay a bribe for legal rights is disturbing. However, it seems that the state
tolerates street-level bribery. Moreover, actions to fight corruption interna-
tionally fail to target small-scale bribery.
A. Street-level Bribery Tolerated by the State
The attitude of the state towards corruption in Slovakia can be ob-
served from: the level of criminalization of particular forms of corruption,
the ability to enforce criminal provisions relating to corruption, and the ex-
istence of other state methods aiming to prevent corruption.
The Slovak Criminal Code64 criminalizes corruption in paragraphs
160-163a. The most recent amendment of the Criminal Code incorporates
Slovak international obligations arising from the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions of 199765 and from the Council of Europe Criminal Law Con-
vention on Corruption of 1999.66 The Criminal Code prosecutes passive
63 Peter Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International
Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.L. 793,
832 (2001).
64 Criminal Code (Act. No. 140/1961, in its present amended form) (Slovk.),
[hereinafter CRIM. C.]
65 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43(1998), (entered
into force on February 15, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/
home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-88-3-no-no-7198-88,00.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 29, 2002) Slovakia ratified the Convention on September 24, 1999 [here-
inafter OECD Anti-bribery Convention].
66 Slovakia ratified the Convention on June 9, 2002, COE Criminal Law Conven-
tion on Corruption, supra note 8.
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bribery67 (demanding, accepting of bribes or other inappropriate benefits, or
accepting of a promise that bribe or other inappropriate benefit will be
given) as well as active bribery 68 (giving, offering or promising of bribes or
other inappropriate benefits). The Code also criminalizes indirect bribery
(intermediary influence 69), in its passive and active form. A recent amend-
ment to the Criminal Code criminalizes active, passive and indirect bribery
in the private sector as well. Paragraphs 160a and 161a target passive and
active bribery regardless of the bribe-offering person's legal entitlement.
The paragraphs 160b, 160c, 161 b, and 161 c implement the provisions of the
OECD Anti-bribery Conventions. Paragraph 160 of the Code punishes the
accepting or requesting of bribes, or accepting of a promise that a bribe will
be given to "public officials" and judicial employees. Passive or active
bribery, where the bribee is a medical employee, is prosecutable under para-
graph 160a. The criminal act of bribery requires proof of a causal relation-
ship between a bribe and the abuse of public or vested power. Bribery after
the fact is also criminalized. For court employees, the criminal act of pas-
sive bribery usually amounts to, in parallel, the criminal act of a public
official, according to paragraph 158.70 The punishability of the criminal act
of active bribery is nullified when a bribe-giver gave or promised a bribe
upon request from the bribee, and where without delay a public prosecutor,
or a police authority was notified.71
Whether the value of a bribe is a relevant material qualifier of the
criminal act of bribery is controversial. Paragraph 3(2) of the Slovak Crimi-
nal Code does not criminalize acts that pose an insignificant degree of dan-
ger to society, even if that act contains other elements of a criminal act.
The Criminal Code, in its Common provisions, 72 sets out a methodology for
determining the degree of danger to society. The common provisions are
applicable throughout the Code. Material qualifiers relevant for the deter-
mination of the degree of danger to society are, inter alia, the importance of
protected interest (e.g., whether bribery occurs in public administration, and
67 Paragraphs 160, 160a, 160b, and 160c of the CRIM. C., supra note 64.
68 Id. 161, 161a, 161b, and 161c.
69 Those are either "public officials" or "other persons", who decide in matters
relating to "satisfaction of the needs of citizens" in the area of material, social,
cultural or other needs of natural or legal persons. HARALD STIFFEL & JOZEF
KocICA, TRESTNY ZAKON: STRUCNY KOMENTAR, 313 (2001).
70 Paragraph 158 "intentional abuse of power of a public official". Malpractice by
medical employees is prosecuted under 221, 222, 223 and 224 of the CRIM. C.,
regulating intentional and negligent damage to health. Supra note 64.
71 Id. 163.
72 Id. [ 89(13).
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REPUBLIC OF KENYA
ANNEX 3. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
SUMMARY OF DELIBERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUSTICE AND
TRUTH COMMISSION
OVERVIEW
The Conference was held on July 4-5, 2003 at the Intercontinental Hotel,
Nairobi. Justice and Constitutional Affairs minister Hon. Kiraitu Murungi
opened the conference, which was attended by senior government officials
including his assistant minister, Hon. Robinson Githae, and Permanent Sec-
retary, Jeremiah Matagaro. Assistant Minister of State in the Office of the
President, Hon. Kivutha Kibwana, also attended, as did all members of the
Task Force.
The conference was called to facilitate a national dialogue on the necessity
of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission for Kenya. At the end
of the conference, delegates passed a declaration to the effect that:
1. The Government of Kenya immediately establish a Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission to address both gross human rights
violations and economic crimes committed in Kenya between 1963
and 2002;
2. The Commission be empowered to recommend restitution, repara-
tions, prosecutions and conditional amnesties;
3. The Commission should be independent, effective and broad-based
in membership;
4. The Commission must not be a witch-hunt or a white wash instru-
ment; and
5. The Commission should address grave injustices related to land.
The conference was unanimous that the country had been wounded by the
atrocities of the past and a mechanism to find out the truth, mete out justice
to victims and bring about national healing was necessary. Various con-
cerns were raised with the government:
1. Government commitment
Delegates were concerned about the government's commitment to change
and questioned the belief that the NARC administration was actually ready
to preside over change and therefore committed to a truth, justice and rec-
onciliation process. Some participants said that the government had yet to
prove that it is reformist and not engaged in business as usual. The real test,
2004
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the investigation and prosecution of public corruption particularly challeng-
ing.86 The fight against corruption must be systematic and more complex,
rather than focusing strictly on prosecution. 87 On June 21, 2000, the Slovak
Government approved the National Program for the Fight against Corrup-
tion.88 The Government cooperated with the Slovak chapter of Trans-
parency International. The main pillars of the programme are: (1) the
building of legal consciousness and increasing public sensitivity to corrupt
conduct; (2) enforceability of legal rules; (3) the elimination of unnecessary
administrative barriers; (4) transparency in regard to funding of political
parties; and (5) the improvement of social control mechanisms. 89 These
pillars are indeed impressive, but concrete steps necessary to fulfill the
slightly generalized goals would be more decisive. Most of the outlined
solutions focus on the elimination of grand-scale corruption affecting public
funds and the administration of public property in state-owned enterprises
and party finance. 90
86 Peter Henning, supra note 63, at 804.
87 See, e.g., Petter Lagseth and Edgardo Buscaglia, Empowering the Victims of
Corruption through Social Control Mechanisms, paper presented on October 9,
2001, on IACC's meeting in Prague, http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/crime/gpacpubli-
cations/CICP-17_oct2.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
88 The fight against corruption was among the top priorities for the current gov-
ernment, elected in 1998. Unfortunately, the launch of the programme against cor-
ruption was delayed until half-way through its term. The National Programme of
the Fight Against Corruption, http://www.goverment.gov.sk/bojprotikorupcii/
NPBPK_21_6_2000-en.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2002). [hereinafter National
Program Against Corruption]The implementation of the National Programme is the
subject of individual action plans for the Fight Against Corruption. Central Coordi-
nation Unit for the Fight Against Corruption is central body responsible for the
implementation of the programme. The Central Coordination Unit was created ac-
cording to the Government Resolution Act on Central Coordination Unit for the
Fight Against Corruption (Act No. 949/2000, in its present amended form)(Slovk.).
89 Id. National Program Against Corruption, Part D2: Principles of the Fight
Against Corruption.
90 Id. National Program Against Corruption, Part El: Elimination of Potential
Causes of Corruption. In these areas, prevailing form of existing corruption is gen-
erally considered to be grand-scale corruption rather than small-scale corruption.
See, e.g., Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann, and Mark
Schankerman, Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How firms
and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies The
World Bank and The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development policy
research working paper 2312, 3 (2000) http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/
pdf/measure.pdf. (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
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However, how does the programme deal with the problem of street-
level bribery? Among the goals of the programme is the reform of the
judiciary. The document indicates that fast-tracking the court process and
influencing the outcome of judicial proceedings are the two major corrupt
practices of the judiciary. The programme strategy highlights the mea-
sures9' to increase the overall effectiveness of the system, and to eliminate
potential opportunities for corruption. The strategy fails to address the
problems of inadequate personal protection of judges. A model of 'court
management' to increase the speed of court proceedings has been imple-
mented only in one district court in Slovakia.92 Unfortunately, it is unlikely
that the model will be implemented nation-wide during the term93 of the
current government, or in the near future. 94 Moreover, no substantial
91 The programme enumerates the following measures, which must be undertaken
by the judiciary:
I. E to adopt a code of judicial ethics and to publicly pledge to respect it,
II. a to significantly strengthen judicial self-governing bodies (judicial
council and association of judges), including decisions concerning re-
cruitment, promotion and disciplinary issues of judges
III. E to conduct the reform of court administration and financing, includ-
ing the strengthening of the role of self-governing bodies in this area,
IV. 0 to improve effectiveness of work at individual courts...
V. 0 to simplify procedural rules in civil, commercial and criminal law
VI. 0 to strengthen the adversarial character of court proceedings
VII. 0 to change the court docket system ...
VIII. E to expert competitive pressure on the judiciary by supporting alter-
native dispute resolutions methods...
IX. 0 to publish judicial decisions on the merits of the case on the Internet
X. 0 to impose clear sanctions for unlawful decisions.
National Program Against Corruption, Part E3: Reform of the Judiciary supra note
88.
92 The model has been implemented in District Court in Banska Bystrica, in Co-
operation with the EU sponsored programme PHARE and the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Central and Eastern European Initiative. Report of the Ministry of Justice
of July 7, 2002, supra note 37.
93 The electoral term of the current government ends in September 2002.
94 The Ministry of Justice initiated implementation of the court management
model into other courts only very recently (July 7, 2002). According to the Minis-
try, the model should be introduced to all Slovak district and higher court approxi-
mately at the end of 2004 and beginning of 2005. However, this initiative, so far,
has not been approved by the Slovak government, whose term ends in September
2002. Report of the Ministry of Justice of July 7, 2002, supra note 37. Unfortu-
nately, it is unlikely that the newly-elected government will continue this project.
According to pools on political parties preferences it is unlikely that the current
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countable for their misdeeds. This strategic repositioning had to be stopped
for the further reason that such persons would be able to subvert the new
order.
Powers, Privileges and Limitations
The Commission should have power to summon witnesses, to restore stolen
property, order restitution and compensation, grant amnesty, recommend
lustration and demand that perpetrators apologize to victims.
Terms of Reference for the Commission
The conference recommended that the commission be focused in its work.
Lack of focus might lead to a situation where the commission investigates
everything and nothing.
The commission should investigate gross human rights violations, eco-
nomic crimes and grave injustices related to land. The country has seen
very dark days when citizens were tortured, detained without trial or even
killed because they did not politically agree with officialdom or wanted
restoration of democracy, good governance, respect for fundamental rights,
freedoms, and the rule of law, which officialdom regarded as treason.
One presenter argued that the commission should only focus on gross
human rights violations and leave out economic crimes. The government
should establish other mechanisms for addressing economic crimes like it
has already done under the Goldenberg Inquiry. Combining both economic
crimes and gross human rights violations would make the commission's
work endless, become a ploy to delay justice, and defeat the purpose of a
truth commission. A truth commission should ideally finish its work in less
than three years. The majority, however, felt that the commission should
address both gross human rights violations and economic crimes because
there is a very thin line between them. Other proposed duties of the com-
mission included:
- Political assassinations, massacres and police killings, land clashes
of 1991-1992 and 1997-1998, corruption, land grabbing and other
historical claims relating to land;
- Reports of previous inquiries to avoid duplication;
- Educating the public on matters of rights, remedies and the work of
the commission so that those that would choose to forgive should do
so with a clear understanding of their rights;
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- Mandate to order restitution and compensation for the victims. Vic-
tims will feel sacrificed if they do not get some form of acknowl-
edgement and recognition;
- Establish personal and state responsibility for certain past crimes.
The commission should establish and document the policy object be-
hind the crimes. It is important to target the sponsors and key pillars
of the crimes since going after every small perpetrator would tie
down the commission in detail;
- The task force was urged to clearly think through the question of
amnesty and whether the president could exercise the power of
clemency for some people and for certain crimes. The question of
amnesties was seen as one of the incentives that would be given to
the "soldiers" who would be useful in producing evidence linking
the crime to the "commanders." Those that refuse amnesty should be
prosecuted;
- The commission should be able to offer counseling to victims who
had been greatly hurt and traumatized.
The commission must protect both victims and perpetrators.
Membership of the Commission
The membership of the commission should be broad without compromising
competence and integrity which are core to legitimacy that is absolutely
critical to the success of the commission.
The commission should comprise doctors because of questions of torture,
lawyers, psychologists, a representative of the Lands Office, police, judici-
ary and religious groups.
Historical Period to be Investigated
The commission should investigate all human rights violations from 1963
through 2002.
A few people, and notably the keynote speaker, wanted these investigations
to look from 1895 on. Colonial rule was seen as having sown the seeds of
oppression and the culture of impunity. One person said that the commis-
sion should investigate from 1990 to 2003 because the expansion of the
democratic space put every public official on notice that certain acts were
illegal, unconstitutional and outrageous to Kenya's public morality. They
should therefore be held to account.
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OECD Anti-bribery Convention. 101 The OECD Convention is aimed at cor-
ruption in international business transactions. It explicitly exempts "small
facilitation" payments from the definition of a bribe. "Small facilitation"
payments do not constitute payments made "to obtain or retain business or
other improper advantage" within the meaning of paragraph 1 of the Con-
vention and, accordingly, they are not in contravention. 10 2 There is no ex-
planation as to why petty bribes do not fall within the Convention definition
of bribery. The OECD did not justify its position. It claims that such pay-
ments are generally illegal in various countries already and "other countries
can and should address this corrosive phenomenon by such means as sup-
port for programmes of good governance. However, criminalization by
other countries does not seem practical or effective complementary ac-
tion."'01 3 Disturbingly, in practicing "small facilitation," foreigners might
bid up the size of 'petty bribes.' 'Wealthy' countries who care about fair-
ness concerns for nationals conducting business within these 'corrupt'
countries, 104 remain unconcerned about the direct impact of street-level
bribery on the local economy.
Another important international effort to curb corruption is the
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 0 5 Authors of
the Convention, while working on the definition of corruption, wanted to
ensure that it offers the widest scope necessary for a "comprehensive ap-
proach to fight against corruption as a threat to democratic values, the rule
of law, human rights and social and economic progress."'10 6 The Conven-
tion definition10 7 is indeed broad. It covers passive and active bribery, in
101 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 65.
102 Official commentaries on the OECD Anti-bribery Convention, Article 1, 9, at
http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-88-3-
no-no-7441-88,FF.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
103 Id.
104 Kevin E. Davis, supra note 100.
105 See supra note 8.
106 Section 25 of the Explanatory Report to the COE Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm, (last visited
Aug. 29, 2002).
107 According to the COE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, active bribery
of domestic public officials means: "when committed intentionally, the promising,
offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to
any of its public officials, for himself or herself or for anyone else, for him or her to
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions." Passive bribery
occurs "when committed intentionally, the request or receipt by any of its public
officials, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage, for himself or herself or for
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the public as well as private sector. The Convention, however, excludes the
"undue" advantage of minimum gifts, gifts of very low value or socially
acceptable gifts.' 08 As argued earlier, the definition' 09 of a small gift can be
rather subjective. From an extreme perspective, the vast majority of street-
level bribery falls out of the scope of criminal provisions against corruption.
The Convention criminalizes acts of passive bribery regardless of whether
the public official received a benefit in exchange for a legal right or for an
illegal favour.110
Internationally, states recognize the importance of curbing corrup-
tion. However, petty bribery-principally affecting poor people in poor
countries-is beyond the reach of the international community. Further-
more, most international indices, such as the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index, are based on the perception of business peo-
ple. Although these types of indices tell us about the degree of corruption
within a country, they fail to tell us about its impact on the daily lives of the
poor. The indices fail to tell us about less visible petty corruption, which
discourages economic advancement."' Distinguished scholars also appear
to have the tendency to underestimate the impact of petty bribery. 112
anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act
or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions." Arts. 2, 3, COE
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 8.
108 Section 38 of the Explanatory Report to the COE Criminal Law Convention,
supra note 106.
109 See infra p. 311.
110 Section 39 of the COE Criminal Law Convention, Explanatory Report, supra
note 106.
111 Michael Johnston, Measuring the New Corruption Rankings: Implications for
Analysis and Reform, in POLrrITC CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXT 870-
877 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 2002).
112 For instance, Stephen Salbu, in his attempt to draw distinction between large
and petty bribery, claims that the key distinction between petty and large bribes is
social effect. A large bribe has a potential to cause greater economic, political, and
social costs than a petty bribe, although there are a few exceptions to this rule, such
as petty bribes paid to building inspectors. "Yet while grand bribes are consistently
associated with major motives and consequences, petty bribes are distinct because
they lack any consistently significant motive or impact. Cumulatively, petty bribes
have a relatively insignificant impact. Because the stakes of petty bribery tend to be
small, the social ramifications also tend to be small. Compare this impact to the
consequences of a large-scale bribe. When a government awards a contract to build
a bridge based on the biggest bribe rather than the soundest engineering plans, it is
more likely the bridge will collapse and injure or kill people." Stephen R. Salbu, A
Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery 33
2003
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IV. STREET-LEVEL BRIBERY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
An important feature of street-level bribery is that people are re-
quired to bribe for legal rights. The state, because of its failure to prevent,
and prohibit street-level bribery and its failure to effectively enforce the
Slovak Criminal Code provisions relating to corruption, bears the ultimate
responsibility for access to a legal right being conditioned upon the pay-
ment of a bribe. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 indicated that in the judiciary people
bribe to obtain adjudication without unreasonable delay, while in health-
care, it is for the right to health. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss the scope of
these two human and constitutional rights from an international and a na-
tional perspective. The paper then places the phenomenon of street-level
bribery into a human rights framework. Because of the conditionality of
access to human rights, the state violates the people's ability to enjoy the
right to a fair trial and the right to health. At first glance, street-level brib-
ery infringes these two human rights. The violation injures all who are
required to bribe to enjoy the right to adjudication without unreasonable
delay and the right to health. 113 However, in a more hidden form, street-
level bribery deprives certain segments such as the poor, from access to
these rights and thus violates their right to be free from discrimination.
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 657, 664-665 (2000). Salbu, in his analysis, points out overall
there are more petty bribes paid than large bribes. The problem of his analysis,
however, lies in the underestimation of this fact. Consider a situation when every-
one in need of health treatment is required to pay a bribe. Then we have to take into
account a percentage of the population, without financial resources for a bribe. In
developing countries and countries with economies in transition, it is quite a signif-
icant percentage of the overall population. In the long run, there might be more
damage to health and deaths caused by improper healthcare because a "petty bribe"
was not offered. Moreover, petty corruption, especially in the judiciary, clearly
undermines the functioning of democracy and the rule of law. Democratic govern-
ance importantly contributes to a desirable economic performance. See, e.g.,
Jagdish Bhagwati, The New Thinking on Development, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 50 (1995).
Corruption in the judiciary undermines stability and predictability in the enforce-
ment of law and thus hampers economic development. Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria
Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corruption in the Judiciary 30 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BuS. 95 (1999).
113 An exemption is the core obligation of the right to health, to respect access to
healthcare without any discrimination - the injured are people with low financial
endowment. For more details, see infra IV.C.
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A. The Right to a Fair Trial
1. The International Approach
The right to a fair trial, contained in Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 114 (ICCPR) applies to criminal pro-
ceedings, as well as to "suits at law"' 15-non-criminal proceedings. 116 The
concept of "fair hearing," included in Article 14(1), requires several neces-
sary conditions, such as equality of arms, respect for the principle of adver-
sary proceedings, prohibition of ex officio correction changing an earlier
verdict, and expeditious procedure.' 17 The determination of the meaning of
"expeditious procedure," or without "undue delay," depends on the circum-
stances and the complexity of the case. 1 8 For instance, in cases concerning
the access of a divorced parent to his children, there might be a special need
for expeditious adjudication.1 19
The case law of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Freedoms 120 contains well-established principles for the
114 Slovakia became a party to the ICCPR on May 28, 1993 as a successor state of
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 Dec. 1966, U.N. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/
6316(1966) 99 U.N.T.S. 171(entered into force 23 March 1976), available at http:f/
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/accpr.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
115 See Article 14 paragraph 1 of the ICCPR, Id. The right to have his or her case
tried without unreasonable delays is contained also in the paragraph 3(c) of Article
14, which, applies solely to criminal proceedings. Given the focus of this paper are
civil proceedings; jurisprudence under the paragraph 3(c) will not be further
discussed.
116 See Y. L. v. Canada, Communication No. 112/1981, U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
40(A/41/40) 9.2. (1986).
117 Yves Morael v. France, Communication No. 207/1986, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40
(A/44/40) 9.3 (1989). The Committee clearly outlined the requirement that justice
shall be delivered expeditiously as a necessary element of a fair hearing also in e.g.
Ruben Toribio Munoz Hermoza v. Peru, Communication No.203/1986, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) (1988). The breach of the guarantee of expeditious hear-
ings occurred in, e.g., Fei v Colombia, Communication No. 514/1992, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/53/D/514/1992 (1995); Chisala Mukunto v. Zambia, 768/1997, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/66/D/769/1997 (1999).
118 See, e.g., Morael v. France, para. 9.4.
119 See Fei v. Colombia, para. 8.4, supra note 117.
120 The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, 4
Nov. 1950, ETS No. 005, (entered into force on September, 3 1953), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited Aug. 29,
2002) [hereinafter the European Convention on Human Rights], Slovakia has rati-
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determination of "unreasonable delay." The European Convention on
Human Rights enshrines the right to a fair trial in Article 6, which incorpo-
rates the requirement relating to the length of the proceeding. 121 Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights, similarly to Article 14 of the
ICCPR, applies in criminal and civil proceedings. 2 2 As a general principle,
the value of speed must be balanced against the value of justice, and the
state shall take all necessary measures to elucidate the truth. The reasona-
bleness of the duration of the proceedings shall be assessed in light of the
particular circumstances of a case, with regard to the complexity of such a
case, the conduct of the applicant, and the conduct of the authorities. In
assessing the complexity of the case, the European Court of Human Rights
takes into account all aspects-including the subject matter, international
elements, or disputed facts. 123 Where time plays a role in deciding upon the
merits-for instance in childcare cases, there may be a special need for due
diligence. 124
In civil proceedings, commencement is considered to start with the
initiation of proceedings to determine a dispute as it relates to civil rights
and obligations.125 The termination of civil proceedings occurs on the date
of judgment in the final instance. Hence, if resolution of a dispute of civil
rights and obligations requires a decision of a constitutional court, that pe-
riod must also be taken into account. 126 The Slovak Ministry of Justice, in
fled the European Convention on Human Rights and Protocol to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, March 20 1952, ETS No. 009, as amended, (entered into
force on May 18, 1954) on March 18, 1992. The protocol is available at http://
conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (last visited Aug 29, 2002).
121 Id. Article 6, 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
122 The European Convention Institutions, interpreted that "[A]rticle 6, paragraph
(1) ... covers all proceedings the result of which is decisive for private rights and
obligations...". Ringeisen v. Austria, (merits) (No.1)1 Eur. Ct. H.R.455 (Series A)
No. 13, 94 (1971). In Benthem case the Court summarized the principles that
emerge from the case law: (a) conformity with the spirit of the Convention, dispute
should have substantive rather than formal meaning; (b) the dispute concerns both
questions of law and fact, may relate to the existence of a right as well as manner in
which is a right is exercised; (c) the dispute is of genuine and serious nature; (d)
there is direct link between the dispute and the right in question. Benthem v. The
Netherlands, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R.1 (Series A) No. 97, 32 (1985).
123 Leonard H. Leigh, The Right to a Fair Trial and the European Convention on
Human Rights, in THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 651-652 (David Weissbrodt &
Rudiger Wolfrum, eds., 1996).
124 See, e.g., H. v. U.K., 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. 95 (Series A) No. 120 (1987).
125 Damell v U.K., 18 Eur. Ct. H.R 205 (Series A), No. 272 (1993).
126 Leigh, supra note 123 at 652.
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recording the length of civil proceedings, considers transfer to another court
a 'termination' of proceedings. 27 The statistics of the Ministry of Justice
are therefore unreliable, since the actual length of a disputed matter is likely
vastly different. Only delays that are attributable to the state may justify the
failure to comply with the requirement of 'reasonable time.' 128 Applicant
delay, including the failure of the applicant to cooperate with judicial au-
thorities, must be disregarded when determining if reasonable time has been
exceeded. 129 The state's excuses-e.g., administrative difficulties, struc-
tural reorganization, provisional methods such as giving priorities-should
not prolong the adoption of effective measures. 130 The court should adhere
to the principle of proper administration, according to which the domestic
courts are under a duty to deal properly with the cases before them, in any
event.' 3' Clearly, states are under an obligation to organize their judicial
systems in such a way that the domestic courts can meet the Convention
requirements. 13 2
2. National Implementation of the Right to a Fair Trial
The Slovak Constitutional Court has interpreted the Constitutional
right to a speedy trial133 in a similar manner as the European Court on
Human Rights. The right to a fair trial applies to criminal and civil pro-
127 See discussion at 308, above.
128 Proszak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2/1997/786/987, (1997).
129 Monnet v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Series A) No.273-A(1993), Beaumartin v.
France, 19 Eur.Ct.H.R. 587 Series A, No. 296-B(1994), Ciricosta and Viola v. It-
aly, Eur. Ct. H.R (Series A, No. 337(1995).
130 See, e.g., Zimmerman and Steiner v. Switzerland, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R 17 (Series A),
No. 66 (1983).
131 Boddaert v. Belgium, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R 242(Series A) No. 235-D, paragraph 39
(1992).
132 Salesi v. Italy, 257 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Series A) 54 (1993).
133 Constitution of the Slovak Republic (Act No. 460/1992, in its present amended
form) [hereinafter SLOVK.CONST.] See Section 7 - Right to Judicial and Other
Legal Protection, Article 48(2) states: "Every person has the right to have his or her
case tried publicly without unreasonable delay, to be present at the proceedings,
and to object to any evidence therein. The public can be excluded only in cases
specified by law."(Emphasis added) See also Finding of the Constitutional Court of
the Slovak Republic [CCSR] Ref. No. II. US 26/1995. Findings and Rulings of the
CCSR are available at http://www.concourt.sk/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
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ceedings, including administrative proceedings, 34 and the decision-making
of other public administration bodies.135
The purpose of the right to be adjudicated without unreasonable
delay is to eliminate legal uncertainty. It is not a matter of merely delivering
a decision. The elimination of legal uncertainty is only possible through a
legal decision delivered without unreasonable delay. 136 In assessment of
"unreasonable delay", the Constitutional Court reviews the particular cir-
cumstances of each case 137 according to three criteria. The first criterion is
complexity, as to the law and as to the facts. Drawing on the case law of the
European Court for Human Rights, the Constitutional Court has held that
there is a need for a special due diligence in instances such as child cus-
tody,138 when time is pressing. The court then reviews the acts of the par-
ticipants in the dispute. When determining "reasonable time," the
Constitutional Court will take into account the participants' acts that may
have inhibited the proceedings artificially. Such delays may mitigate the
state's responsibility in creating "unreasonable delay."' 139 Finally, acts of
commission or omission by state bodies are relevant. 140 The Constitutional
Court considers proceedings and procedures applied by a court in hearing
and deciding a case on its merits, and also in hearing a motion to order an
injunction. 141 The right to have one's case heard without unreasonable de-
lay may be also violated by subjective impediments on the part of the
judge. 142 The court is responsible to organize its administration in such a
manner that it can fulfill adjudication without unreasonable delay. 143 The
134 Finding of the CCSR Ref. No. I. US 11/1998.
135 The right to be adjudicated without unreasonable delay applies to e.g. Slovak
Tax Revenue Office or Cadastral office. Findings of the CCSR: Ref. No. II. US 62/
1999, Ref. No. I US 45/1999, Ref. No. II. US 19/2000, Ref. No. 14/2001.
136 Findings of the CCSR: Ref. No. II. US 26/1995, Ref. No. I US 57/1997, Ref.
No. II. US 3/2000.
137 Finding of the CCSR Ref. No. I. US 17/1999.
138 Findings of the CCSR: Ref. No. II. US 17/1999, Ref. No. II. US 33/1999, Ref.
No. II. US 35/2001.
139 Findings of the CCSR: Ref. No. I. US 92/1997, Ref. No. I. US 53/1998.
140 Finding of the CCSR: Ref. No. II. US 64/1997. The court for instance found
that a lower court failed 12 times to secured presence of qualified lay jury and thus
caused unreasonable delay. Finding of the CCSR Ref. No. I. US 9/1999.
141 Finding of the CCSR Ref. No. II. US 813/2000.
142 Finding of the CCSR Ref. No. I US 64/2000.
143 Findings of the CCSR: Ref. No. II. US 26/1995, Ref. No. II. US 74/1997, Ref.
No. I. US 36/1999, Ref. No. I. US 37/1999, Ref. No. I US 44/1999, III. US 33/
2001.
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Constitutional Court has refused to accept lack of court personnel or finan-
cial capacity 1" in assessing delays in proceedings. 145
3. Violation of the Right to a Fair Trial
The state is responsible for organizing its justice system such that
all cases are heard without unreasonable delay. Several indicators exist to
suggest that the state has failed to fulfill this responsibility. The official
data of the Slovak Ministry of Justice measures the length of proceedings.
For the purpose of these statistics, "decided" does not necessarily mean a
final decision on the merits, but can also mean a transfer onto another
court. 146 Hence, in reality the actual lengths of civil proceedings are likely
to be significantly longer than represented by the data. Moreover, accord-
ing to those who interact with courts, it is "highly unlikely" that Slovak
courts act without unreasonable delay. 147
The state has failed to enforce criminal provisions relating to brib-
ery, and failed to ensure proceedings without unreasonable delay. State ju-
dicial employees engage in the practice of street-level bribery. 148 The
ultimate consequence is that the state by an act of omission, violates its
obligation to protect the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Slovak Con-
stitution and by International Human Rights Conventions. The victims of
such infringement are all people, directly or indirectly, required to pay a
bribe to obtain adjudication without unreasonable delay.
Furthermore, street-level bribery violates the right to judicial pro-
tection. The Slovak Constitutional Court held that under the right to judi-
cial protection, 149 inter alia, courts and other state organs undertake all
sanctioned under Slovak law. If state organs fail to observe laws, it is con-
sidered a violation of the right to judicial protection. 150 Although the
Slovak Criminal Code fails to criminalize petty bribery, the acts of court
144 Finding of the CCSR Ref. No. US 52/1999.
145 Findings of the CCSR: Ref. No. II. US 64/1997, Ref. No. II. US 55/1997, Ref.
No. I. US 92/1997, Ref. No. II. US 18/1998, Ref. No. US 74/1998, Ref. No. 1II. US
14/2000, Ref. No. US 19/2000, Ref. No. II US 49/2001.
146 Moreover, the data measures only "decided cases", which represents on average
only 40 percent of all cases filled with courts per year. See infra note 11.
147 See id. at 10-12.
148 See id. § 2.1.
149 Article 46(1) of the SLOVK. CONST., supra note 133.
150 Finding of the CCSR, Ref. No. I. US 26/1994.
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employees, directly or indirectly demanding bribes, are clearly not in accor-
dance with the legislation governing judges.' 5'
B. The Right to Health
1. The Right to Health as an International Human Right
A considerable number of International Human Rights Conventions
incorporate the right to health.152 The International Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural rights (ICESCR) and the work of the Committee on
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights offer the most comprehensive ac-
count on the Right to Health. The ICESCR is also an important source of
domestic interpretation of a relevant constitutional norm.15 3 The Slovak
Constitutional Court held that the majority of the Constitutional Fundamen-
tal Rights and Freedoms, enshrined in the Fifth Chapter-"Socio-economic
Rights"-are indeed a constitutional transformation of Slovakia's interna-
tional obligation. Thus, the Slovak interpretation of socio-economic
rights154 should follow the prevalent international interpretation of the rights
enshrined, inter alia, in the ICESCR. 155
Article 12 of the ICESCR promulgates the right of "everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health."'1 56 Article 12, in its second paragraph, enumerates "steps to be
151 Law of Judges and Lay Judges, (Act No. 385/2000, in its present amended
form)(Slovk.).
152 Slovakia is a party to the following International Conventions, incorporating the
Right to Health: The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights of 1966, (Art. 12); the International Convention on Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966 (CERD), (Art. 11.1 (f)); the International
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of
1979 (CEDAW), (Art. 12); the Convention on the Rights of Child of 1989, (Article
24) and the European Social Charter of 1961; (Art. 11).
153 The Slovak Constitution contains the right to health, in Article 40. "[E]very
person shall have the right to health protection. Through compulsory medical insur-
ance, the citizens shall have the right to free health care and medical equipment for
disabilities under the terms to be provided by law." SLOVK. CoNsT., supra note
133.
154 In that case, the dispute right was the right to a free education. Ruling of the
CCSR, Ref. No. US 5/1993.
155 Id.
156 Art. 12(1) of the ICESCR. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 19 Dec.1966, U.N. G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI) UN Doc. A/6316 993
U.N.T.S. 3. (entered into force January 3, 1976), available at http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu3/b/acescr.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002). Slovakia ratified the IC-
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taken by the State Parties. . . to achieve the full realization of this
right.. .."157 The elements creating the right to health can be divided into
two categories. One encompasses the elements relating to healthcare. The
other relates to the underlying pre-conditions for health, such as availability
of clean water, adequate nutritious food, and environmental standards. 158
This paper will focus on street-level bribery in healthcare.
The ICESCR Committee comprehensively explains the right to
health in its General Comment 14.159 General Comment 14 sets out the
right's normative content, in terms of essential elements or guiding princi-
ples, where the precise application is left to the state. The elements are
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality. 160 Availability of
health services means that the state shall have a sufficient quantity of these
services for the whole population. Accessibility of health care services con-
tains four overlapping dimensions. The Committee particularly highlights
the requirement of observation of all four dimensions in relation to the most
vulnerable members of society. 161 Health facilities must be accessible to
everyone without any discrimination. Healthcare services must be con-
figured for safe physical accessibility. Affordability or economic accessibil-
ity requires the states to create conditions upon which all social groups,
including socially disadvantaged groups, can afford access to healthcare
services. 162 The fourth dimension imposes an obligation on the states to
SECR on May 28, 1993 as a successor state of Czech and Slovak Federative
Republic.
157 The steps to be taken, enumerated in the Convention, are:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality
and for healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational
and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and
medical attention in the event of sickness. Id. at Art. 12(2).
158 BRIGIT C. A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 245-246 (1999).
159 The right to the highest attainable standard of health, Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 11 Aug. 2000, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4, General Com-
ment 14, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4,+CESCR+
GeneralComment+14.En?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) (Hereinafter
General Comment 14).
160 Id. 12.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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secure everyone's access to impartial information concerning health. 163 The
acceptability of health services means availability of culturally appropriate
services, and observation of medical ethics. Finally, health services must
have good scientific and medical quality.164
Similar to other human rights, the right to health has been devel-
oped within the framework of the so-called tripartite typology of state obli-
gations. All human rights require the state's obligation to respect, protect,
and fulfill them. 165 The Committee gives substantive content to the three
obligations based on the essential elements of the right's normative content.
The obligation to respect, in particular, requires "refraining from denying
and limiting equal access for all persons. ... "166 The obligation to protect
includes a duty to take legislative and other measures to ensure that citizens
have equal access to health services when provided by third parties. Fi-
nally, the obligation to fulfill requires that the state, inter alia, gives ade-
quate recognition to the right to health in national legislation, to adopt
national health policies and devote sufficient financial resources to
healthcare. 167
The Committee recognizes that each state's ability to create condi-
tions for the highest attainable standard of health (and thus comply with the
ICESCR) might differ. Each state's ability is conditioned by its economic
development and available financial resources. 168 Nevertheless, a "state
party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compli-
ance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are
non-derogable.' 1 69 Among the core obligations are the duties to ensure that
access to health facilities is without any discrimination, particularly for the
most vulnerable members of society, and to ensure equitable distribution of
all health services and goods. 170 The Committee made special recommen-
dations with respect to particular categories of persons, including women,
children, adolescents, the elderly, the disabled and indigenous people. 171
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 Brigit C. A. Toebes, The Right to Health, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 178 (Asbjcrn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas eds., 2nd ed., 2001).
166 Gen. Cmt. 14, 34, supra note 159.
167 Id. 35.
168 Id. 30.
169 Id. 47.
170 Id. 34(a), (e).
171 Id. 20-27.
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2. National Implementation of the Right to Health
The Slovak Constitution guarantees the right to health and free
healthcare through compulsory health insurance pursuant to Chapter 5 (Ec-
onomic, Social and Cultural Rights 172), under Article 40.173
The notion of free healthcare through compulsory medical insur-
ance is rather confusing. The legislation purports to contain the precise
understanding of the right. According to the Constitution, the right to
health can only be claimed within the limits of the law providing the exer-
cise thereof. 174 The interpretation is explained in the Law of Medical Insur-
ance. 175 According to the Law, every person with a permanent residency in
Slovakia, a temporary work permit, 176 or with refugee status, shall have
172 It is worth noting that in Slovakia a primary method for the protection of social,
economic, and cultural rights is through the Constitution. Constitutional entrench-
ment of socio-economic rights indicates the importance of these rights within the
Slovak legal system. This form of protection is still new in comparative constitu-
tional law. Traditional liberal Constitutions, such as the United States Constitution,
provides protection exclusively to political and civil rights. Sandra Liebenberg, The
Protection of Economic and Social Rights in Domestic Legal Systems, in Eco-
NOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGwrs 56-59 (Asbjom Eide, Catarina Krause &
Allan Rosas eds., 2nd ed., 2001).See also Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem, Consti-
tutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South
African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 131-134. (1992).
173 See supra note 153, for wording of Article 40 of the SLOVK. CONST. "The right
to health". Law on the People's Health protection, in Paragraph 1(2), defines health
protection as "[s]et of measures consisting in the prevention of occurrence and
dissemination of diseases and in limiting their and other health disorders occur-
rence, in the improvement of health through the improvement of health care for
sound conditions of life, work and a sound way of living and in the administration
of State health supervision". Law on the People's Health protection (Act No. 272/
1994, in its present amended form)(Slovk.).
174 Article 51of the SLOVK. CONST. "Joint provision in relation to Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms", supra note 133. According to the Findings of the Slovak
Constitutional Court, legislative regulations in regards to the right to health has to
have a form of a law, adopted by the Slovak Parliament. Government's degree and
a Decree of Ministry of Heath Care, executing the Slovak Law on of HealthCare
(Act No. 220/1993, in its present amended form)(Slovk.), were found in a breach of
the Slovak Constitution. Findings of the CCSR Ref. No. US 7/1994 and US 8/
1994.
175 Law of Medical Insurance (Act No. 273/1994, ih its present amended
form)(Slovk.).
176 This refers to a category of people with a working permit, or people who own
private enterprises in Slovakia.
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compulsory medical insurance. 177 The state penalizes a failure to register
with a medical insurance company 178 to pay compulsory medical insurance
fees. 179 The state is obliged to pay compulsory health insurance for certain
categories of persons-children up to 18 years of age, pensioners, the un-
employed, and pregnant women. The state also pays for day care for chil-
dren up to 5 years old, for seriously physically or mentally handicapped
children up to 18 years old, and for persons over the age of 80. These provi-
sions constitute Slovakia's attempt to comply with its obligation to fulfill
the right to healthcare. In particular, Slovakia is attempting to secure access
to healthcare for the most vulnerable groups of society. Individual compul-
sory health insurance fees and state subsidies finance the funds of insurance
companies. These insurance companies 8 ° are responsible for providing the
state's compulsory medical insurance coverage. The state is also required
to devote additional finances to the funds of the General Medical Insurance
Company.'"'
The Law of Healthcare further encompasses the requirements aris-
ing from the obligation to fulfill the right to health. Healthcare services
177 Paragraph 3 of the Law on Medical Insurance, supra note 175. In addition,
Slovakia is bound by bilateral agreements with 16 countries. According to these
agreements, Slovakia provides free emergency treatment to nationals of these
states, during their stays in the Slovak territory. The states, with which Slovakia has
such an agreement, on a reciprocal basis, are obliged to provide free emergency
treatment to Slovak nationals, who are temporarily there.
178 People can freely choose a medical insurance company, with an exception for
those groups, for whom the compulsory health insurance is paid by the state. See
also infra note 181.
179 Paragraphs 23 to 25 of the Law on the Medical Insurance, supra note 175. The
existing healthcare system in Slovakia has not, so far, institutionalized a system
which would allow people to buy additional health insurance to compulsory health
insurance. Although there has been a discussion to introduce such a new mecha-
nism into the healthcare system, so far it has not been introduced. See e.g. Press
Conference with Minister of Healthcare on April 24, 2001, http://www.ial.sk/
appl/material.nsf/TlacovaKonferencia/OC57CFED lBC4D1F7C 1256B9F00421 E51
?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
180 The status and conditions for the creation of medical insurance companies is
contained in the Law on Medical Insurance, in para. 29 and following, supra note
175.
181 The General Medical Insurance Company was created by and is operated by the
state. The Company insures most of the population. The Law allows private entities
to establish private medical insurance companies and articulates conditions for their
creation. All medical Insurance Companies, established according to the law, have
equal right and obligations regarding the providing of healthcare. Paragraph 29, Id.
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must be professional, continuous, and available. 18 2 Healthcare is to be pro-
vided at a standard that reflects available knowledge of medicine and other
biomedical sciences. 183 Healthcare, based on medical insurance means:
emergency, ambulant, in-house, healthcare for people with chronic ill-
nesses, preventive treatment, provision of drugs, 184 transportation of the
sick to the closest medical service and balneotherapy. 185 Healthcare, within
this meaning, does not cover treatments that do not have a healing pur-
pose. 186 The state is the major provider of medical services, and employs
the majority of medical staff. Hence, the state is also required to directly
subsidize medical services, in order to meet its obligation to fulfill the right
to health.
The obligation to respect equal access to healthcare is primarily
secured in the constitutional right against discrimination, 187 articulated in
Article 12. This constitutional provision is directly applicable to all domes-
tic legislation. The Law of Healthcare stipulates that everyone has the right
to healthcare, including medicinal drugs.' 88 The obligation to respect the
patient's rights was set forth in the Patient's Bill of Rights, adopted only
recently. 189 Article 1 of the Bill deals with the importance of adherence to
human rights while a person is being treated. Importantly, Article 1(2) con-
tains the right against discrimination while being provided with medical
services. 190 The Bill guarantees the right to equal access to health services,
182 Paragraph 3 of the Law of Healthcare (Act No. 277/1994, in its present
amended form) (Slovk.).
183 Id. 4.
184 The coverage of the medical drugs is limited to certain categories of drugs
according to the Law on Healing Order (Act No. 98/1995, in its present amended
form)(Slovk.).
185 Limited to instances, when required, as determined by a physician.
186 Paragraph 4 of the Law of Medical Insurance, supra note 175.
187 See SLOV. CONST. Article 12, supra note 133.
188 The Law of Healthcare, para. 3, supra note 182.
189 The Patient's Bill of Rights was adopted by the Slovak Government on April
11, 2001. Patient's rights covered in the Bill are already contained in the Interna-
tional Convention, to which Slovakia is a party, the Slovak Constitution and other
laws regulating the sphere of the healthcare. This is a reason why adoption of the
Bill, which interferes with the right to health, by government, is constitutional. See
also supra note 174.
190 Id. "[A]ny discrimination based on race, colour, sex, religion, political affilia-
tion or conviction, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status is
forbidden while providing medical services." The Patient's Bill of Rights. The enu-
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role of civil society in this process as well as outlining the handicap of
the Commission's limitations, especially its inability to examine the
socio-economic implications of apartheid.
39. Joe Thloloe, Showing Faces, Hearing Voices, Tugging at
Emotions: Televising the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52
NIEMAN REP. 53, 1 (1998).
This article underlines the instrumentality of the media in facilitating
reconciliation during the truth and reconciliation process.
40. Hugo Van der Merwe & Polly Dewhirst, Non-Governmental
Organizations and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: An
Impact Assessment, 26 POLITIKON 55 (1999).
This article examines the impact of NGOs on the whole process of
truth and reconciliation in South Africa starting their analysis with the
period imiiediately prior to the formation of the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission. It also discusses the impediments to the efficacy of
this relationship.
41. Paul Van Zyl, Justice in Practice - Dilemmas of Transitional
Justice: The Case of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 52 J. INT'L AFF. 647 (1999).
Van Zyl assesses the causes behind the creation of truth commissions
and explores different facets of the South African Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission, looking at how and why it positively impacted the
country. The article further explains the role of a truth commission in
broadening the international discourse on transitional justice.
42. Brian Walsh, Resolving the Human Rights Violations of a
Previous Regime, 158 WORLD AFF. 111 (1996).
Walsh examines the reasons why governments elect different policy
options in dealing with previous human rights violations and estab-
lishes the different aims that they seek to fulfil. He also examines the
case of Rwanda in this regard.
43. Richard Wilson, Reconciliation and Revenge in Post-Apartheid
South Africa - Rethinking Legal Pluralism and Human Rights, 41
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 75 (2000).
Wilson analyzes the tension within the national post-apartheid human
rights discourse, which is based on the reconciliation formed around
shared values and institutional structures. She examines the logic of
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
retributive justice found in township courts (lekgotla) and concludes
that the differences in legal orders in South Africa has its basis in dif-
ferent conceptions of justice.
44. Tom Winslow, Reconciliation: The Road to Healing? 6 TRACK
Two 38 (1997).
This article regards the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission as successful in generating national reconciliation and healing,
but as less successful in reconciliation and healing at the individual
level. Winslow highlights some aspects of the truth and reconciliation
process that hampered personal reconciliation and healing. He also
suggests that reconciliation is not a conditio sine qua non for such
healing as individual healing can take place without reconciliation, but
accepts that reconciliation does go a long way to secure individual
healing.
45. Jos6 Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political
Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past
Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425 (1992).
Zalaquett argues that the prevailing political environment shapes what
human rights strategy a newly established democracy will embrace in
confronting past human rights atrocities. He supports this approach,
urging however that international law be respected in this enterprise.
He also provides the example of the Chilean Truth Commission as a
way of illuminating how past violations of human rights can be ad-
dressed despite political constraints.
B. General Interest Periodicals
46. Heribert Adam, Trading Justice for Truth, THE WORLD TODAY,
Jan., 1998, at 11.
Adam examines the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion and ponders whether it would achieve national reconciliation and
unity.
47. Timothy Ash Garton, True Confessions, N.Y. TIMES REV. BOOKS,
July 17, 1997, at 33.
This is a critical examination of the South African Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission. It exposes its strengths and weaknesses.
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The definition shares similarities with the definitions relating to other UN
Conventions, such as the International Convention on Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CEDR) or the International Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
which led to the creation of the so-called "universal composite concept" of
discrimination.20 1 Although the ICESCR Committee has not yet established
its own definition of discrimination, its practice suggests the approach to
discrimination is in concert with the universal composite. 20 2 The universal
composite20 3 characterizes four main elements: (1) a difference in treatment;
(2) certain purpose or effect; (3) discrimination based upon certain prohib-
ited grounds; and (4) occurrence in selected fields. 2°4
1. Difference in Treatment
Unfair discrimination occurs when either (or both) equality before
the law or equal protection of the law is denied.20 5 The problem with street-
level bribery does not lie in equality in law, but equality before the law-
equality in fact. Equality before the law is in the scope of the prohibition
under Articles 2.1,206 26207 of the ICCPR208 and 2.2209 of the ICESCR. 210
201 MATHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SO-
CIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 164 (Pbk ed.
with corrections, 1998).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 163. The composite was established according to similarities of discrimi-
nation definitions provided in several international human rights conventions.
Those are ILO Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation (ILO NO. III), The UNESCO Convention against Discrimination
in Education, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women.
204 The outline of this composite introduced Egon Schwelb, The International Con-
vention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L &
COMP.L.Q. 996, 1001 (1996) reproduced in id. at 163.
205 Janet Kentridge, Equality, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 14-17
(Matthew Chaskalson, ed., 1999).
206 Article 2.1 of the ICCPR reads: "Each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Supra note 114.
207 Id. Article 26 of the ICCPR reads: "All persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this re-
spect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
STREET-LEVEL BRIBERY
"The guarantee of this equality means only that the law-applying organs are
permitted to consider only those differences which the statutes to be applied
by them expressly recognize. Thereby nothing else is stipulated but the
general principle of the lawfulness of the application of the law, imminent
in all law . ,"211
"Equality, it has sometimes been said, means equal treatment for
those equally situated and, indeed, equal treatment for unequals is itself a
form of inequality. '21 2 In the judiciary, everyone's case shall be treated
equally without unreasonable delay according to the order in which the peti-
tions were filed. Special due diligence shall be applied to cases when time
is pressing. In the context of the healthcare system, this means that each
patient insured according to the state compulsory medical insurance system
shall be treated on the same basis as others in a same or very similar health
condition. However, the state judicial and medical employees treat simi-
larly-conditioned people differently based upon the payment of bribes. The
state's failure to prevent and to prohibit street-level bribery and to enforce
criminal provisions in relation to corruption, leads to a de facto inequality,
when people are treated differently as a result of the payment of bribes.
The ICESCR Committee uses terms such as 'distinction,' 'exclu-
sions,' 'restrictions' or 'preferences' to describe differentiated treatment.
This Committee noted that differentiated treatment does not necessarily
have to be aimed against a certain group, but can take the form of prefer-
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status."
208 B.G. Ramcharan, Equality and Nondiscrimination, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 250 (Louis Henkin
ed. 1981).
209 Article 2.2 of the ICESCR reads: "The State Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to guarantee that the right enunciated in the present Covenant will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status."
Supra note 156.
210 CRAVEN, supra note 201 at 160.
211 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1960), cited in E.W. VIERDAG, THE
CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1973). Similarly, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court held that equality before the law "is designed to advance the
value that all persons be subject to equal treatment of the law and not suffer any
greater disability in the substance and application of the law than others. This value
has historically been associated with the requirements of the rule of law that all
persons be subject to the law impartially applied and administrated". R v Turpin
[1989] 1 SCR 1296 at 1326.
212 Ramcharan, supra note 208 at 252.
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ence of one group at the expense of another.21 3 The result of street-level
bribery is that those who pay a bribe are preferred in medical treatments.
Given the insufficient availability of medical services, preferential treat-
ment occurs at the expense of the poorest segments of the population. The
same applies to the justice system.
According to the Human Rights Committee, discrimination does
not include differentiated treatment which is "reasonable and objective and
if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Cove-
nant. '21 4 Equality before the law requires that applications of all laws and
regulations (including administrative decisions) should "be based on clear
coherent grounds, ensuring equality of treatment." 21 5 Street-level bribery
would fail to pass the Committee's test. It has been recognized that bribery
threatens, rather than promotes, human rights. 216
Similarly, in the Belgian Linguistic Case217 the European Human
Rights Court, in determining whether the difference in treatment constitutes
discrimination, observed the legal practice of democratic states and held
that "the principle of the equality of treatment is violated when the distinc-
tion has no objective and reasonable justification. The existence of such
justification must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the mea-
sure under consideration, regard being had to the principles which normally
prevail in democratic societies. '21 8 The differential treatment, because of a
bribe or the lack of such a payment, is in sharp contradiction to democratic
principles. The treatment certainly has no objective or reasonable
justification.
2. Purpose or Effect of Differentiated Treatment
Although the Human Rights Committee investigates whether a state
intentionally discriminates, intent alone is not a deciding factor. Discrimi-
nation can occur unintentionally or without malice. 219 The "purpose" of the
state has also been of little importance to the ICESCR Committee. Rather,
213 CRAVEN, supra note 201 at 164.
214 Gen. Cmt. 18, 13, supra note 200.
215 Gauthier v. Canada, Communication No. 633/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/
633/1995 (1999). Individual opinion by members Lord Colville, Elisabeth Evatt,
Ms. Cecilia Medina Quiroga and Mr. Hipolito Solari Yrigoyen (partly dissenting).
216 See, e.g., supra note 8 and discussion in sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3.
217 Case Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in educa-
tion in Belgium, (merits) 1 Eur. CT. H.R.252 (Series A) No 6 (1968).
218 Id. Part B, Interpretation adopted by the Court, Section 10.
219 See, e.g., Broeks v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984 paragraph 16 (1987) or Simunek et. al. v Czech republic,
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the Committee stresses the actual impact of certain discriminatory
measures.
220
When the effect of the law (rather than the law's ostensible pur-
pose) is discriminatory, it indirectly discriminates.221 Indirect discrimina-
tion is characterized by two main elements: (1) appearance of neutrality;
and (2) disproportionate impact on particular groups.222 Bribery of judicial
and medical employees indeed appears to be neutral. Everyone who wants
to have a case heard without unreasonable delay is required to bribe. Eve-
ryone whose health condition requires medical treatment is required to pay
a bribe. However, the burden of this unofficial payment disproportionately
affects the poorer segments of the population.
The impact is two-fold. The more obvious impact is financial.
Medical treatment as well as costs related to judicial protection impose, in
relative terms, a significantly higher burden on the poor. The Survey of the
World Bank 2000 revealed that the respondents with a higher income were
more likely to make unofficial payments.223 However, the data clearly indi-
cates the overall impact of bribery on poor households is significantly more
profound than on wealthier households.224 Moreover, the size of a bribe
does not correlate with the level of their income. 225 For a poor household, a
bribe represents a significantly larger proportion of its income than for a
Communication No. 516/1992, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/586/1994 paragraph
11.7. (1996)
220 Id. at 166. CRAVEN, supra note 201 at 166. Craven furthermore argues that the
Committee's emphasis on the discriminatory effects signals the importance of
equality in result rather than equality in procedure.
221 SARAH JOSEPH et. al., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 534 (Oxford University Press 2000).
222 See, e.g., Lord Lester of Heme Hill QC and Sarah Joseph, Obligation of Non-
Discrimination, in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS AND UNITED KINGDOM LAW 575 (David Harris and Sarah Joseph eds.,
1995); Kentridge, supra note 205 at 14-25; D.J. HARRIS, M. O'BoYLE and C. WAR-
BRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 477 (1995).
223 The Survey of the World Bank 2000, supra note 15 at 21.
224 Id. See generally discussion in the United Nations Development Programme
paper Corruption and Good Governance, which highlighted the key point. Once
public benefits are distributed based on an ability to pay, the poor will be disadvan-
taged. Corruption and Good Governance UNDP discussion paper 3, 45-47 (1997),
http://magnet.undp.org/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) or Sanjeev Gupta et. al., supra
note 5. The report of the World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution
to the Policy Debate, suggests that poverty, in countries with economics in transi-
tion, is highly correlated with administrative corruption, supra note 3 at 20.
225 Id. at 21. It is likely, that the same applies to the justice system.
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wealthier household. For instance, a relatively small illegal payment to a
general medical practitioner represents 0.3 to 9 percent of monthly income.
On average, for a single visit to a medical practitioner, people paid 1 per-
cent of their household income. For the poorest third of the population, it
represents 3.6 percent of income.226 Certain categories of people in
Slovakia, such as the elderly or women227 who traditionally have lower in-
comes 228-are also more likely to need medical services, compounding the
household economic impact.
The second type of impact on the poor (with more serious conse-
quences) relates to the inability to pay a bribe. Since bribes paid to court
employees are significantly higher than those paid to healthcare employ-
ees, 229 it is likely that the poor are discouraged to exercise their right to a
fair trial, even where the case has merit. Alternatively, they may be waiting
for years for adjudication or will be maltreated, if treated at all. Unfortu-
nately, the precise data indicating how maltreatment affects the health of
the people who could not otherwise afford a bribe is not available.230
3. Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination
Poverty does not belong to the specified enumerated grounds con-
stituting prima facie discrimination under Articles 2.1, 26 of the ICCPR, or
Article 2.2 of the ICESCR. 23x However, the enumerated grounds are not
exhaustive. The major difference between the practice of the ICESCR
Committee and the practice of the Human Rights Committee is that the
former has already recognized the social condition of poverty as grounds
for discrimination. Hence, the following paragraphs first discuss the ex-
isting approach of the ICESCR Committee. It is necessary to recognize
226 Id. at 21.
227 Id. The survey revealed that women are more likely to pay a bribe. Similarly,
older people more than younger people are more likely to bribe.
228 Faces of Poverty in Slovakia, in NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
SLOVAK REPUBLIC, 83-83 (2000), http://www.undp.sk/download/NatHDR00/en-
glish/Part3.pdf (last visited Aug. 28 2002).(Hereinafter Poverty in Slovakia) For a
discussion on poverty in Slovakia, see at 55-56, below.
229 See supra note 76.
230 Id. at 116. Only available data are those of the Survey of Miller, Grodeland and
Koshechkina. The survey of small-scale corruption in Slovakia revealed that those
who reported their income as 'fair' or 'good', claimed to have received 'favorable
treatment' more often than those who reported their income as 'not enough to sur-
vive' or 'only just enough'. MILLER, GRODELAND & KOSHECHKINA, supra note 11
at 81. The poor were 9 percent more likely to end up with unsatisfactory treatment.
231 See supra notes 206, 207 and 209.
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poverty as grounds for discrimination within the scope of prohibition under
Articles 2.1 and 26 of the ICCPR.
The ICESCR Committee has been concerned about the extreme in-
equalities of the poor, and recognized the poor are disadvantaged in access
to culture. 232 The Committee recognized the link between poverty and dis-
crimination-"discrimination may cause poverty, just as poverty may cause
discrimination. '233 Poverty has to be understood in broader terms of social
exclusion. Poverty is a "human condition characterized by sustained or
chronic deprivation of resources, capabilities, choices, security and power
necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. '234
The approach to socio-economic status has been well developed,
for instance, in the practice of the Quebec Human Rights Commission. The
Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes a "social condition"
among enumerated grounds of discrimination.2 35 According to the Quebec
Human Rights Commission, determination whether discrimination on the
basis of a social condition has occurred, points to "a person's standing in
society, determined by his or her occupation, income or education level or
family background and the perceptions that are drawn from these various
objective points of reference. '23 6 The Quebec Commission's approach is
particularly valuable, since it combines objective indicators with a broader
concept of poverty as a social exclusion.
Poverty as grounds for discrimination is not always accepted. Op-
ponents often argue that the poor themselves are largely responsible for
their status, opposing the idea that poverty can also be a consequence of
232 Mr. Texier in consideration of the Report submitted by India to the Committee
highlighted a "well know fact in all countries" that the poorest population were
usually the disadvantaged in access to culture. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 29 March 1990, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/SR.16 para. 44.
233 Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, May 4, 2001, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10, paragraph 11, http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.2001.10.En?Opendocument (last vis-
ited Aug. 28, 2002).
234 Id. Y[ 8.
235 Article 10 of the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 19777, c. C-
12, in its present amended form.
236 Lysiane Clement-Major, International Human Rights Standards: The Quebec
Perspective, The Publication of the Quebec Human Rights Commission
Cat.2.600.198, 3 (2000) (emphasis added).
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82. Joseph V. Montville, The Psychological Burdens of History, in A
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND
RESOLUTION, Washington DC, US Institute of Peace, n.d.
Montville argues for an appreciation and acceptance of the need to
address the psychological needs of both victims and victimizers in
conflicts in order for any meaningful resolution to be achieved.
83. ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, (Times Book) (1998).
Neier studies war crimes tribunals, their virtues as well as the issues
they raise. He makes a case for a permanent international war crimes
tribunal.
84. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL, (Yale
University Press) (1997).
This book examines the case of Argentina and how it dealt with previ-
ous human rights abuses and also looks at the problem of transitional
justice through different lenses: moral, political and legal.
85. GUILLERMO O'DONNEL ET. AL., TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT
UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES, (John Hopkins University Press)
(1986).
This is an analytical, comparative and reflective work on how transi-
tions from autocracy and repression to democracy and tolerance have
been and can be achieved.
86. MARGARET POPKIN, PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE: OBSTACLES TO
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN EL SALAVADOR, (Pennsylvania
State Press) (2000).
This book examines the problems of achieving both truth and justice in
El Salvador and looks at the role of the United Nations, United States,
the El Salvador Truth Commission and civil society in this process.
87. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND
THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, (Oxford University Press) (1997).
This book reviews how perpetrators of gross human rights violations
can be brought to justice under international law and the problems at-
taching thereto.
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
88. IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE, (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., Oxford University Press)
(1995).
This book provides a look at how some states in Europe, Asia, Africa
and Latin America as well as international law have dealt with issues
related to serious human rights violations and makes suggestions on
the way forward.
89. TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS,
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., Princeton
University Press) (2000).
This is a thoughtful compilation of different perspectives evaluating
the methods of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion raising, for example, questions on whether it is proper to serve
truth at the expense of justice.
90. DOROTHY C. SHEA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRC: THE POLITICS OF
RECONCILIATION, (U.S. Institute of Peace Press) (2000).
This book looks at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission, the extent to which it drew on the lessons of earlier truth
commissions, its tackling of contentious issues that it faced, its general
impact and the teachings it offers.
91. MPILO TUTU DESMOND, RECONCILIATION IN POST-APARTHEID
SOUTH AFRICA: EXPERIENCES OF THE TRUTH COMMISSION, in
THE ART OF PEACE: NOBEL PEACE LAUREATES DISCUSS HUMAN
RIGHTS CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION 96 (Jeffrey Hopkins ed,
2000).
This is based on an informal conversation among Nobel Peace Laure-
ates. Tutu defends the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission and reflects on how the South African example can be used to
disentangle other tricky political transitions.
92. DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS, (New York
& Doubleday) (1999).
This is Tutu's personal account as the Chair of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. It outlines his thoughts on the need
to both get to the truth and walk through the difficult process of
reconciliation.
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is open-ended, 245 which has an important interpretative result.246 "Every dis-
tinction, of any kind, will invoke the non-discrimination or equality princi-
ple.1247 The protection of Article 26 is rendered when the difference in
treatment affects a group of people, not only separate individuals. 248 The
Human Rights Committee should recognize social condition of poverty as
prohibited grounds for discrimination in the context of street-level bribery
for three major reasons.
First, there are important similarities between street-level bribery in
healthcare and the judiciary. In both instances, the rendering of rights is
conditional, with indirect discriminatory impact on the poor. Once the so-
cial condition of poverty is recognized under the ICESCR, given the salient
similarities of discrimination in both public sectors, it should be recognized
as prohibited grounds under the ICCPR as well.
Second, the history of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the ICCPR suggests that there is an option to subsume
poverty under the grounds for discrimination prohibited by the ICCPR. The
enumerated prohibited grounds for discrimination in the ICCPR are inten-
tionally the same as in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.24 9 During the drafting process of the Universal Declaration, one of
the major areas of controversy related to the understanding of "status" and
"property." The Soviet delegation initially wanted to add "social status"
after the word "property." Social status refers to the Russian word
"sosolvie," which refers to the privileges of feudal classes, which were gen-
erally determined by birth rather than wealth. However, the United King-
dom delegation wanted to delete "property" and keep only "status." The
Soviet delegate objected and argued that the word property should remain
since the rich and the poor should have the same rights. Ultimately, the
delegates accepted the compromise of the Chinese delegate, who suggested
inserting the words "or other" between the words "property" and "status",
245 Article 26 states in part:"f[a]gainst discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour...".[Emphasis added], see supra note 207 for complete wording of the
Article.
246 Anne F. Bayefsky, The Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Inter-
national Law, 11 HUM. RTS. J. 1, 5 (1990).
247 Id. at 5.
248 Hendrika S. Vos v The Netherlands, Communication No. 218/1986, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) (1989), see para. 1 of the separate opinion of Messrs Fran-
cisco Aguilar Urbina and Bertil Wennergren.
249 MARC J. BossuYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 486, (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 1987).
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which would make the point made by the Soviet delegate. 250 This indicates
the drafters originally accepted the idea that human rights should be guaran-
teed regardless of people's social condition.
Martha Jackman's compelling argument that the poor create a par-
ticular group deserving protection offers third reason why the Human
Rights Committee should recognize poverty as grounds for discrimination.
Jackman argues that systemic disadvantaging of the poor importantly im-
pacts their ability to politically organize.25 1 "IT]he poor, although signifi-
cant as a group, are both inadequately organized and lacking in resources,
which greatly limits the likelihood and effectiveness of collective political
action. ' 252 The poor are thus a discrete and insular minority deserving pro-
tection. 253 The argument attempts to fulfill the requirement of the Human
Rights Committee that discrimination has to affect a group of people, not
merely individuals. 254
4. Scope of Non-discrimination Provisions
Article 2.1 of the ICCPR and Article 2.2 of the ICESCR operate in
a traditional sense; the test is whether the difference in treatment has the
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, the enjoyment or the exer-
cise of human rights. 25 5 Article 2.1 applies to ICCPR rights whereas Article
2.2 applies in relation to the rights entailed in the ICESCR.
In the judiciary, the indirect discrimination of the poor impairs their
enjoyment of the right to a fair trial. It amounts to a violation of Article 2.1
of the ICCPR. Article 14256 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(similar to Article 2.1 of the ICCPR) represents a subordinate equality
norm.257 It prohibits discrimination solely in the context of the rights and
250 Reproduced in Sigrun Skogly, Article 2, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 61-62 (Asbjom Eide, et. al., eds., 1992).
251 Jackman, supra note 237 at 95-100.
252 Id. at 98.
253 Id.
254 See infra p.56 and note 248.
255 Bayefsky, supra note 246 at 4 and CRAVEN, supra note 201 at 177-78.
256 See Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 120.
257 Bayefsky, supra note 246 at 6. However, on November 4, 2000, member states
of the Council of Europe agreed upon Protocol 12 to the European Convention on
Human Rights. Protocol 12 extends the prohibition of discrimination in a same
manner to Article 26 of the ICCPR. Protocol 12 prohibits any discrimination,
whether in law or before the law, in regards to any legal right provided in national
legislation. However, the Protocol has not so far come into force. (As of Aug. 29,
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freedoms under the European Convention and its Protocols. 258 Individuals,
injured by indirect discrimination could employ the same strategy as the
thesis suggested in the context of Article 2.1 of the ICCPR and seek inter-
national protection with the European Court of Human Rights.259
By contrast to Articles 2.1 of the ICCPR, 2.2 of the ICESCR, and
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 26 of the
ICCPR, applies itself as an autonomous right.260 The article prohibits "dis-
crimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public
authorities. ' 261 Article 26 also applies to subject matter covered in, for ex-
ample, the ICESCR.262 It leads to the conclusion that the state, because of
its failure to enforce criminal provisions relating to corruption and failure to
prohibit and prevent street-level bribery, indirectly discriminates against the
poor in both justice and healthcare, and thereby violates Article 26 of the
ICCPR. Recognition that the state is responsible for the violation of Article
26 is crucial. The ICCPR, unlike the ICESCR, offers a petition procedure
under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,263 which allows victims
affected by street-level bribery to seek international human rights protection
with the Human Rights Committee. For the poor indirectly discriminated
against in healthcare, it is more effective to invoke a violation of Article 26
of the ICCPR than a violation of Article 2.2 of the ICESCR.264
02). Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, ETS No. 177.
258 The European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly guarantee
equality before the law. However, it has been widely acknowledged that equality
before the law is implied in term like "everyone". Torkel Opsahl, Equality and
Non-Discrimination, 1 NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1990), reprinted
in TORKEL OPSAHL, LAW AND EQUALITY: SELECTED ARTICLES ON HUMAN RIGHTS
182-184 (Asbj0m Eide ed., 1996).
259 Slovakia is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note
120.
260 Gen. Cmt. 18, supra note 200 para. 12.
261 Id.
262 Broeks v. The Netherlands, supra note 219.
263 Slovakia is a party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, as of May 28
1993. The Protocol allows individuals, belonging to the jurisdiction of party states
to the Protocol, after exhaustion of all domestic remedies to submit a written com-
munication to the Committee for Consideration. Article 2 of the First Optional Pro-
tocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 999
U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
264 The state, by acts of omission, indirectly discriminates against the poor, in their
access to healthcare. Street-level bribery impairs their ability to exercise their right
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Finally, Constitutional Article 12.1 is autonomous, and in principle
Article 26 applies: the state is indirectly discriminating against the poor in
both sectors, and violates their constitutional right in this regard.
V. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, corruption is perceived as an economic and a political
problem.265 However, in its often underestimated form, street-level bribery
has important human rights implications. Street-level bribery directly un-
dermines the quality of life of individuals. The Slovak example focused on
street-level bribery in two key public sectors: the judiciary and healthcare.
Street-level bribery in these public sectors share the same disturbing pat-
tern-people are bribing others to secure their Constitutional human rights.
The state's tolerance of street-level bribery not only undermines enjoyment
of the right to a fair trial and the right to health, but also has additional
consequences. The poor are indirectly discriminated against, and are de
facto excluded from access to justice and healthcare. The state is responsi-
ble for human rights violations because of its failure to prohibit and prevent
street-level bribery, and enforce criminal provisions relating to corruption.
In a modern democratic society, the state is obligated to prevent any kind of
repetition of human rights violations.
Slovakia is applying for membership in the European Union (EU).
One of the important preconditions of membership imposed by the EU is a
decrease in the level of corruption. 266 Thus far, the EU has been unsatisfied
with the Government's progress,267 especially in relation to small-scale
to health, recognized in the ICESCR, to which Slovakia is a party. It leads to the
violation of Article 2.2 of the ICESCR, supra note 156.
265 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 55 at 226.
266 See, e.g., Part B. 1.1, "Criteria For Membership: Anti-corruption measures" of
the 2001 Regular Report on Slovakia's Progress Towards Accession of the Com-
mission of the European Communities , 13.11.2001, SEC 1754 Brussels, 2001,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/sk en.pdf (last visited Aug. 29,
2002).
267 The EU pre-accession advisor to Slovakia, Jorge Espina, on May 3, raised con-
cerns that the current anticorruption system in Slovakia is ineffective. EU Adviser
says Slovak Anti-corruption system ineffective, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING,
May 4, 2002. The former communist states hoping to join the European Union in
2004 still lacks the means to crack down on corruption and ensure the proper use of
EU funding, Brussels said yesterday." Michael Mann & Judy Dempsey, EU en-
trants not equipped to fight corruption, says report, FIN. TIMES, June 6, 2002 at 6.
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bribery.268
Appropriate remedies for these violations and institutional recom-
mendations address the key aspects of the state's failure-the failure to pre-
vent and enforce criminal provisions related to street-level bribery, and the
failure to prohibit it.
Michael Johnston suggests that along with institutional reforms en-
hancing transparency and accountability to fight corruption, there is a need
for social empowerment. It means expanding and protecting a range of
economic and political resources and alternatives for ordinary citizens.
Johnston suggests that institutional reforms largely focus on the opportuni-
ties and alternatives open to officials, and the lack of alternatives open to
citizens. 269
From the perspective of social empowerment, one of the options is
to remedy the state financing of the institutionalization of poverty law prac-
tice, and the financing of pro bono legal clinics. This would aim to prevent
street-level bribery. At the same time, it would serve as a method of en-
hancing prosecutions relating to bribery. This concept of empowering the
poor, well-established elsewhere,270 does not exist in Slovakia. Institution-
alization of poverty law271 would help the poor exercise their rights of ap-
peal in relevant situations; for instance, when 'ignored' by medical
practitioners or in court proceedings through unreasonable delay.
268 For instance, on April 26, Jorge Espina expressed that the level of corruption in
Slovakia is one of the greatest worries connected with the country's possible EU
entry. "When evaluating corruption, it is necessary to differentiate between corrup-
tion at higher positions - which is common in all countries, even in the most devel-
oped - and corruption at lower levels, which is widely spread in Slovakia..." EU
concerned about level of corruption in Slovakia, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING,
April 27, 2002.
269 Michael Johnston, Fighting Systemic Corruotion: Social Foundations for Insti-
tutional Reform 2nd revision (1997), at http://people.colgate.edu/mjohnston/
MJ%20papers%2001/EJDR%20article.doc (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
270 The practice of poverty law and functioning of pro-bono clinics, staffed with
professional legal practitioners as well as law students has been well established,
for instance, in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom or the United States. For
the evolution of the "poverty law movement" in the United States, which has be-
gan in the 1960s, see, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960-1973 (1993); ARYEH NEIR, ONLY JUDGEMENT:
THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE (1982).
271 Slovakia should, for instance, devote sufficient funds to introduction of poverty
law courses into Law schools, as well as establish pro bono clinics for law students
practice.
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The objective of poverty law is to help the poor to organize them-
selves. 272 The underlying notion of poverty law is that "[p]overty will not
be stopped by people who are not poor. If poverty is stopped, it will be
stopped by poor people. '273 Hence, poverty law practice could bring im-
provements in other issues that typically frustrate the poor, such as proper
determination of welfare benefits, or access to housing. Finally, it is crucial
that these public interest institutions are located close to people, not only in
the larger cities, but also in the traditionally poorer rural areas.
The literature on corruption suggests a whole range of recommen-
dations on elimination and prevention of corruption in the judiciary. 274
Among other institutional reforms required, an effective introduction of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms 275 into the Slovak envi-
ronment may be particularly useful. One of the reasons for the high level of
bribery in the judiciary is that the courts do not have the sufficient person-
nel or the financial capacity to address all cases. ADR is almost non-exis-
tent in the Slovak environment. Introduction of ADR would decrease the
number of commercial cases, creating more room for the justice system to
act without "unreasonable delay" in other civil matters.
Enforcement of crimes relating to small-scale bribery is costly and
(because of the secretive nature of corrupt exchanges) difficult. However,
since street-level bribery importantly undermines the enjoyment of human
rights, the current strategy of non-prosecution and tolerance is unaccept-
able. The state should engage in a "zero-tolerance" strategy. Zero-toler-
ance policing stems from the Broken Windows Theory. 276 The underlying
assumption of this theory is that uncontrolled incivilities produce a fertile
atmosphere for more serious crimes.2 77 In this view, small offences and
272 Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053-56
(1970).
273 Id. at 1053.
274 For a more comprehensive account, see ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 55 at
151-174.
275 In a Latin American context, Edgardo Buscaglia empirically proved that intro-
duction of the ADR mechanisms contributed to the decrease of corruption in the
judiciary. Edgardo Buscaglia, An analysis of Judicial Corruption and its Causes:
an Objective Governing-Based Approach, 21 INT'L REV. L.& ECON. 233, 247
(2001).
276 Charles Pollard, Zero Tolerance: Short-term Fix, Long-term Liability?, in ZERO
TOLERANCE: POLICING A FREE SOCIETY, 45 (Norman Dennis ed., 1997).
277 Id. at 45-46. According to the "Broken Windows" hypothesis, minor disorder if
tolerated, produce an environment that is likely to attract crime. Once minor of-
fences are tolerated, it signals to potential criminals that their delinquent behaviour
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petty crimes importantly degrade a living environment and directly affect
the quality of life. Zero-tolerance policing can make a visible difference in
decreasing petty crime; thus improve the overall living environment and
indirectly create an atmosphere inhospitable to more serious criminals. 278
A necessary precondition for the introduction of zero-tolerance
strategy is an amendment of the Slovak Criminal Code, which would ex-
plicitly prohibit passive and active bribery regardless of the value of a bribe.
The zero-tolerance strategy should primarily target prosecution of passive
bribery, when a state employee directly or indirectly demands a bribe to
render rights. The state should also prosecute active bribery, especially
when a bribe is given or offered in exchange for illegal favours. Moreover,
the state should provide an accessible institutional mechanism for actual or
potential victims of bribery to report incidents to public authorities.
Focusing on enforcement of criminal provisions relating to street-
level bribery would ultimately lead to less tolerance for both small and
large-scale corruption. The sensitivity towards large-scale corruption
would increase not only among the public, but also among petty officials.
As a result, prosecution of petty bribery would significantly increase deter-
rence of officials engaging in corrupt practices.
Finally, this analysis is not limited to Slovakia, nor its judiciary or
healthcare system. It is applicable in the context of other countries, espe-
cially in the Central and Eastern European region. Moreover, and more
importantly, it is applicable to any corrupt public sector, where people are
directly or indirectly required to bribe others to secure legal rights.
will not be prosecuted and that no one is in charge. It progressively breaks down
community standards and leaves the community vulnerable to crime. James Q. Wil-
son and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, 249 (3) THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29,
33-32(1982), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/crime/windows.htm
(last visited Aug. 29, 2002). See also, e.g., James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling,
Making Neighborhoods Safe, 263(3) THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 46, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/crime/safehood.htm (last visited Aug. 29,
2002); GEORGE L. KELLING, CATHERINE M. COLES & JAMES Q. WILSON, FIXING
BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME (1996).
278 Norman Dennis, "Introduction", in ZERO TOLERANCE: POLICING A FREE SOCI-
ETY, 3-4 (Norman Dennis ed., 1997).
